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ABSTRACT
The conventional interpretation of the Constitution
assumes that the Committee of Style, which created the final
draft of the Constitution, lacked authority to engage with
substance; therefore, any arguably substantive changes it
purportedly made should be disregarded in favor of earlier
draft language found in the records of the Constitutional
Convention. This “Style doctrine” has been embraced by the
Supreme Court and several leading constitutional scholars.
This Article argues that the Style doctrine is historically
unfounded and obscures the Constitution’s original meaning.
The Committee of Style was not prohibited from proposing
substantive changes. In any case, most of the revisions
proposed by the Committee of Style clarified or reinforced
Federalist positions rather than suggesting substantive
changes. Ultimately, the Style doctrine is an artifact of postratification developments tending to disregard elements of the
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more nationalistic constitutional vision of the Federalist
Framers.
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INTRODUCTION
In the waning days of the Constitutional Convention, a
five-member ad hoc committee produced the near-final draft
of the Constitution. Formed on September 8, 1787, this
committee was directed to “revise the style of and arrange
the articles agreed to” by the full Convention. 1 Most of the
final wording of the Constitution and all of its organizational
structure were crafted by this committee, which is uniformly
referred to simply (and as I will argue, misleadingly) as “the
Committee of Style.” On Saturday, September 15, after three
days of debate, the Convention voted unanimously to
approve the Committee of Style draft with only a handful of
minor or very specific changes. 2 Between Saturday evening
and Monday morning, an “engrosser” hand-copied the final
document on four handsomely calligraphed parchment
pages, which the delegates signed on Monday, September
17. 3
Despite the Convention’s unanimous approval of
virtually all of the Committee of Style’s language, 4 a doctrine
has emerged that the final language of the Constitution
should be disregarded if it can be traced to the Committee of

1. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 547 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Journal). Citations to
Farrand’s Records in this Article will identify the source of the document by the
name of the delegate whose private notes are cited (e.g., “Madison,” “McHenry”)
or, where applicable, the official Convention “Journal.” This practice is advisable
in light of the research of Professor Mary Bilder, who has shown that the Journal
is more reliable, and Madison’s notes are less reliable, than traditionally believed.
See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal
Convention?, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620 passim (2012).
2. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 621–22 (Journal); id. at 633
(Madison).
3. Leonard Rapport, Printing the Constitution: The Convention and
Newspaper Imprints, August-November 1787, PROLOGUE, Fall 1970, at 69, 70–74;
Denys P. Myers, History of the Printed Archetype of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 217, 217 (2008).
I.A.

4. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 633 (Madison); see infra Section
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Style and shown to differ in substance from wordings found
in Convention floor motions and committee reports prior to
the Committee of Style draft. I call this “the Style doctrine.”
The Supreme Court, as well as “a veritable who’s who of
leading constitutional scholars,” have all at various points
deployed the Style doctrine—in effect giving draft language
priority over the Constitution’s final language. 5 The reason
invariably given is that the Committee of Style had “no
authority” to make substantive revisions to any provisions
previously agreed on by the Convention. 6 Therefore, this
reasoning goes, where constitutional text raising an
interpretive problem is known to have been crafted by the
Committee of Style, the prior draft language—rather than
the Constitution’s final language—is controlling.
This is at best a curious approach to constitutional
interpretation, and seems hard to square with textualism in
any form, including originalist textualism. But the Style
doctrine’s potential for mischief runs deeper. At a minimum
it distorts our understanding of the Constitution’s history. As
ably demonstrated by Dean William Treanor in a recent
article, the Committee of Style revisions leaned in a
nationalist direction and reinforced the constitutional vision
of the Federalists, who predominated at the Constitutional
Convention. 7 A doctrine inviting us to disregard those
5. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener:
Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 120 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 107 (2021). Standing alone against this “who’s who,” Professor Mary
Sarah Bilder is the only constitutional scholar I have found to dispute the
contention that the Committee of Style was formally limited to stylistic revision.
In an evocative paragraph, she questions whether the name “Committee of Style”
provides a sufficient basis to presume a limit on the committee’s “jurisdiction”
and points out that the official Convention journal referred to it at times as the
“Committee of Revision.” Bilder, supra note 1, at 1648; see, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 581, 610 (Journal).
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 8; see also David S. Schwartz, Framing the
Framer: A Commentary on Treanor’s Gouverneur Morris as “Dishonest
Scrivener,” 120 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Framing the Framer].
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revisions furthers the historical myopia that exaggerates
how much the preferred views of the JeffersonianMadisonian Republicans, which became ascendant only after
the election of 1800, were embedded as the Constitution’s
“original meaning.” 8
Further, the Style doctrine opens a potential Pandora’s
box of arguments to disregard the Constitution’s final
language—even its plain, unambiguous language—if there is
an arguably substantive difference between the Committee
of Style draft and some earlier draft provision. While the
majority of the Committee’s revisions did not change
substantive meaning, at least three provisions have surfaced
where the Style doctrine could do significant interpretive
mischief—and there may be others. 9
In this Article, I argue that whatever reasons there
might be to depart from the prima facie meaning of
constitutional text, the Committee of Style’s supposed lack of
substantive authority should not be one of them. The
prevailing tendency to treat the Committee of Style’s textual
revisions as illegitimate whenever they are arguably
substantive rests on a distortion of the Convention’s history.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the Committee of
Style’s work and the manner in which it is factored into
constitutional interpretation. The prevailing Style doctrine
8. In this Article, I use the terms “Federalist” and “Republican,” as
extremely useful shorthands. It should be noted that, applied to the
Constitutional Convention, these labels are anachronistic. The term
“Federalist”—along with “Anti-Federalist”—emerged shortly after the close of the
Philadelphia Convention to label the supporters and opponents of ratification.
See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at xiv–xv, 92–95 (2010). Only in the 1790s did “Federalist” become the label
for the party of Washington, Hamilton, and Adams. The opposition, led by
Jefferson and Madison, coalesced into a party that named itself “Republican.” See
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 53, 161–62 (2009). The major line of division relevant to the current
discussion is that Federalists leaned toward a strong national government, while
Republicans favored states’ rights and a narrow construction of national powers.
See Treanor, supra note 5, passim (using the same terminology).
9. See infra Section I.D.
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is applied ambiguously by the Supreme Court and
constitutional scholars, in one of two different ways, to
disregard the substantive work of the Committee of Style. On
one view, the Committee of Style is conclusively presumed to
have followed its supposed instructions to refrain from
substantive editing; because it by definition made only
stylistic changes, we can consult earlier draft language and
construe the final language to be synonymous. On the other
view, the Committee of Style flouted its supposed
instructions; but because it was authorized only to make
stylistic changes, any arguably substantive changes it may
have made can be disregarded in favor of the prior draft
language. Either way, the prior language is controlling. To
show what is at stake in the use of the Style doctrine, I then
briefly summarize the arguably substantive changes made
by the Committee of Style.
In Part II, I question the conventional view that the
Committee of Style lacked authority to engage with
substance. There is scant evidence that the Committee of
Style was in fact formally restricted or informally expected
to confine itself to a narrowly constrained definition of
“stylistic” editing. On the contrary, the Framers appear not
to have been sticklers about committee “jurisdiction,” at least
by the late summer, and the Committee of Style’s purported
instructions closely paralleled those given to the Committee
of Detail, which courts and commentators have always taken
to be substantive. Moreover, the understanding of “style”
imposed by later courts and commentators is itself unduly
formalistic and narrow, and fails to take realistic account of
the daunting editorial task facing the Committee of Style.
Finally, any claim that the Committee of Style’s work can be
disregarded as ultra vires fails to account for the fact that
the full Convention ratified the Committee’s work by
approving its draft.
In Part III, I address Dean William Treanor’s important
revisionist account of the Committee of Style. Treanor argues
persuasively that any textualist argument that prioritizes
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pre-Committee of Style draft language over the final
language of the Constitution is misguided. Yet he frames his
article as an accusation that Gouverneur Morris—
presumably the Committee’s principal draftsman—
dishonestly smuggled substantive changes into the
Committee of Style draft to subvert the will of the
Convention on several matters. 10 This framing is curious,
since it undercuts his argument against relying on preCommittee of Style draft language. I argue further that it is
based on weak circumstantial evidence that is contradicted
by more plausible evidence and inferences in the historical
record.
Finally, in Part IV, I address the interpretive
implications of the historically enriched understanding of the
Committee of Style’s work.
I.

DISREGARDING THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE

A. Background: The Work of the Committee of Style
On September 8, 1787, the Constitutional Convention
delegates decided “to appoint a Committee of five to revise
the style of and arrange the articles agreed to” by the
Convention. 11 This committee has come to be known as the
“Committee of Style and Arrangement,” or “Committee of
Style,” for short. This was the tenth of eleven ad hoc
committees appointed by the Constitutional Convention
between its May 25 start date and its final adjournment on
September 17, and the last one to issue a report. 12 The

10. See Treanor, supra note 5, passim.
11. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547 (Journal).
12. See John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S.
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 174 (2006). The
last committee to be appointed was a five-man committee to consider George
Mason’s pet proposal to authorize Congress to enact sumptuary laws, on
September 13. That committee never reported a proposal, and may not even have
met. See id. at 173; see also infra note 96.
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Convention named five delegates to this committee: Rufus
King of Massachusetts, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania,
Alexander Hamilton of New York, James Madison of
Virginia, and, as chair, William Johnson of Connecticut. On
September 12, the Committee reported a revised draft of the
Constitution. The next morning, printed broadsides of the
Committee’s text were distributed to the delegates. 13 Over
the next three days, the Convention examined this draft, and
at the end of the day on September 15, the Convention
unanimously approved the Committee of Style draft having
made only a small handful of changes. 14 Thus, the final
version of the Constitution signed on September 17 closely
resembles the Committee of Style draft in wording and
substance. 15
“The articles agreed to,” revised by the Committee of
Style, consisted of the Committee of Detail draft circulated
to the delegates on August 6 as amended by the dozens of
changes and additions made by the Convention between
August 7 and September 8. 16 The Committee of Style most
13. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 582 (Journal, Sept. 12) (“Ordered
that the Members be furnished with printed copies thereof.”); id. at 609
(McHenry, Sept. 13) (“Recd. read and compared the new printed report . . . .”).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 215–217. Voting at the Convention was
by state, rather than “per capita” by delegate. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 8 (Journal) (“A House, to do business, shall consist of the Deputies of
not less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater
number of these [i.e., states] which shall be fully represented . . . .”). The final
vote by state was unanimous, but we do not know whether any individual
delegates voted no. 2 id. at 633 (Madison). We do know that three delegates—
George Mason, Edmund Randolph, and Elbridge Gerry—refused to sign the
Constitution. Id. at 631–32 (Madison).
15. Numerous changes to punctuation and capitalization were made in the
process of printing and engrossing (producing a handwritten “fair copy” of) the
Constitution between the final vote of approval on September 15 and the signing
on the 17th. Unresolvable questions remain as to whether some or all of these
changes were directed by the Committee of Style, or other Convention delegates,
or were instead made at the discretion of the printer and engrosser. See David S.
Schwartz & Nicholas Brock Enger, The Dot That Nearly Destroyed Federalism:
Erroneously Parsing Punctuation in the Constitution 16 (April 1, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
16. See infra Section II.B.2.
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famously rearranged the twenty-three articles of the
Committee of Detail draft into the far more elegant seven
articles we find in the final version of the Constitution, and
rewrote the Preamble from “We the people of the States,”
followed by a list of states, to “We, the People of the United
States,” followed by a list of government purposes. 17
Very little is known with certainty about how the
Committee of Style performed its task. Historians agree that
Gouverneur Morris was the draftsman for the Committee. 18
As will be discussed below, the evidence for this is somewhat
thin, and more importantly, some historians have jumped to
the conclusion—probably false—that Morris acted largely on
his own. 19 Other confident assertions by historians about the
Committee are based entirely on speculation or surmise. For
example, it has been stated confidently—but without any
supporting evidence—that the Committee of Style
supervised the printing and engrossing (hand-copying) of the
final version of the Constitution. 20 And central to the
17. Compare 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 590 (Committee of Style’s
proposed preamble), with id. at 177 (Committee of Detail’s proposed preamble).
The comma after “We” was deleted in the final engrossed version.
18. See, e.g., MAX FARRAND, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 181 (1913) [hereinafter FARRAND, FRAMING]; RICHARD BROOKHISER,
GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS—THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE
CONSTITUTION 87 (2003); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 346 (2009); Treanor, supra note 5, at 1.
19. See, e.g., FARRAND, FRAMING, supra note 18, at 181; BROOKHISER, supra
note 18, at 87–89; Treanor, supra note 5, at 18. But see infra Section III.B.
20. See Myers, supra note 3, at 220 (“The Committee of Style and
Arrangement, which met daily through September 15 when the Convention
completed its approval, was still responsible for any question respecting the text.
Both engrossment and printing were under its direction.”). There is no evidence
that the Committee of Style was placed in charge of supervising the final
transcription of the Constitution. After the vote unanimously approving it, the
draft Constitution was “[o]rdered to be engrossed and 500 copies struck.”
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 634 (McHenry); see id. at 633 (Madison)
(“The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed.”); Diary Entry of George
Washington (Sept. 15, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 81
(“[A]djourned ’till Monday that the Constitution . . . might be engrossed—and a
number of copies struck off.”). Note the lack of any reference back to the
Committee of Style. Referrals to committees were invariably by motion, not by
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argument of this Article, it has been assumed that the
Committee of Style lacked authority to offer any changes
that might be deemed substantive.
B. The Conventional Approach: The Style Doctrine
An accepted technique of interpreting statutes is to look
to legislative history to resolve ambiguities in the statutory
text. This technique is routinely imported into constitutional
interpretation, even by textualists. 21 Draft language adopted
by the Convention prior to the Committee of Style draft can
be viewed as a form of legislative history. Consistent with
standard interpretive practice, such draft language can be,
and often is, referred to in the hope of clarifying ambiguities
in the final language. 22
There is a subtle but important difference between this
standard practice and the Style doctrine. The standard
the significant word “order.” It is at least as likely that such an “order” meant a
command issued by Washington in the President’s chair to Convention Secretary
William Jackson to see to the printing and engrossing. Also suggestive is the fact
that no handwritten copy of the Committee of Style report has been found—for
example, among the papers of Convention President Washington who took charge
of all the official Convention papers, or Gouverneur Morris who presumably
wrote the draft, or Committee of Style chair William Johnson who presented the
report to the Convention. This suggests that the handwritten report was given to
Jackson, who then burned it along with all the other “loose scraps of paper which
belong to the Convention.” See Letter from William Jackson to General
Washington (Sept. 17, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 82.
21. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1204 (2003)
[hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, Secret Drafting History] (Originalist textualists
“may infer original meaning by examining how [a] clause was affirmatively
changed from its inception to final form at the Philadelphia Convention.”).
22. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520–24 (1997) (comparison
of prior with final draft of Fourteenth Amendment “confirms” Court’s
interpretation); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (“[T]he evolution of the
draft version of the Constitution[] seem[s] to us to lend considerable support to
our reading of the language of the Appointments Clause itself.”); Randy E.
Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2018) (We consult the drafting history and
intentions of the Framers because the Framers “might have special insight into
the machine that they designed.”).
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practice is triggered only by textual ambiguity. But the Style
doctrine can apply irrespective of ambiguity: it is triggered
by an arguable substantive difference with prior text, even
where the final version is unambiguous. Moreover, under the
Style doctrine, the penultimate language—the wording of
pre-Committee of Style drafts—takes on a stronger
significance than it has under standard practice. Rather
than viewed as one indicator of the drafters’ intent among
others, such as debates and extrinsic evidence, it is viewed
as authoritative text. In short, whereas a legislative history
approach involves a disagreement over the meaning of an
agreed text, the Style doctrine generates a dispute over
which of two texts—the wording of the final Constitution or
some earlier draft provision—is authoritative.
Since the Supreme Court first announced the Style
doctrine in Powell v. McCormack (1969), 23 the Court has
applied the doctrine infrequently, half-heartedly, and
ambiguously. Constitutional scholars, on the other hand,
have embraced it with greater enthusiasm, making
arguments to prioritize earlier draft language over equally
clear or clearer language in the final Constitution.
1. The Supreme Court
Powell v. McCormack (1969) 24 is the leading case for the
dismissive approach to the Committee of Style language.
Powell involved a constitutional challenge to a decision by
the House of Representatives to exclude one of its members,
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., an outspoken and controversial
Democratic congressman representing the Harlem section of
New York City. 25 Powell sued various House members and
officials to regain his House seat and backpay. 26 The House
Defendants based one of their arguments on the
23. See 395 U.S. 486, 538–39 (1969).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 489.
26. Id. at 493–94.
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Qualifications Clause in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2: “No
Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
to the Age of twenty five years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” 27
According to the House Defendants, the negative framing of
this Clause meant that the stated qualifications were nonexhaustive, and therefore allowed the House to add grounds
to exclude an elected member on a case-by-case basis. 28 The
Court apparently agreed, at least arguendo, that the
negative framing was non-exhaustive, but nevertheless
rejected the House Defendants’ argument, in part on the
ground that the negative framing was an editorial change by
the Committee of Style. 29 The previous draft of this Clause
by the Committee of Detail had framed the qualifications in
affirmative terms: “Every Member of the House of
Representatives shall be” at least twenty-five years old, a
United States citizen of seven years, and a resident of the
state electing him. 30 According to the Court, the Committee
of Detail’s original draft affirmatively listing the
qualifications was controlling, because the Committee of
Style “had no authority from the Convention to make
alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by the
Convention, nor did it purport to do so.” 31 Either the two
framings were synonymous—i.e., the change was merely
stylistic—or, if substantively different, the Committee of
Style version had to be disregarded.
The Court had no need to resort to this interpretive
move. Because there is no grammatical reason to assume
that a negatively framed list is non-exhaustive, the

27. See id. at 537; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
28. Id. at 538.
29. Id. at 538–41.
30. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 178 (Madison).
31. Powell, 395 U.S. at 539 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 422 n.1 (1928)).
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argument could have been dismissed on that basis. But the
Court’s almost offhand remark about the Committee of
Style’s lack of authority has morphed into an apparent
doctrinal approach. 32 Thus, when the Court in Nixon v.
United States (1993) 33 next confronted an apparent change
by the Committee of Style, the majority “accept[ed] as we
must the proposition that the Committee of Style had no
authority from the Convention to alter the meaning of the
[prior draft language].” 34
In practice, this prima facie doctrine poses a doubleambiguity that offers no determinate guidance about how to
resolve an interpretive dispute. Powell itself is ambiguous in
its mandate that Committee of Style changes be disregarded:
it directs either that the change is deemed purely stylistic
and therefore synonymous with prior language, or that a
substantive change must be rejected as ultra vires. Either
way, the pre-Committee of Style language is deemed
controlling.
But a second level of ambiguity is illustrated by Nixon.
There, an impeached federal judge challenged the
constitutionality of the Senate’s practice of conducting
impeachment trials for lower federal officials by committee
rather than the full Senate. 35 The government argued, and
the Court ultimately concluded, that the word “sole” in the
Clause giving the Senate the “sole power to try all
impeachments” 36
was
a
“textually
demonstrable
constitutional commitment” of the trial procedure to the
discretion of the Senate, making the issue in controversy a
32. The Powell Court rejected the House defendant’s argument as “inherently
weak,” because it had already concluded that legislative bodies historically lacked
power to judge member qualifications on a case-by-case basis. The argument
about the Committee of Style’s authority was tacked onto this point as a
makeweight. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 538–39.
33. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
34. Id. at 231; see also Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474 (2002).
35. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
36. Id. at 231–34; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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non-justiciable political question. 37 The petitioner Nixon had
argued that the word “sole” was added by the Committee of
Style: therefore, adhering to Powell, it could carry no
substantive meaning. 38 The Court rejected Nixon’s
argument, 39 and in so doing, showed how one could follow
Powell and undermine it at the same time. After announcing
that it was bound by Powell to agree that the Committee of
Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the
meaning of the Clause,” the majority nevertheless concluded
that the word “sole” was indeed a substantive change from
the prior draft language, and not “a mere ‘cosmetic edit.’” 40
How to square this circle? “[W]e must presume,” the Court
said, “that the Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing
accurately captured what the Framers meant in their
unadorned language. That is, we must presume that the
Committee did its job.” 41 The Committee of Style, in other
words, is presumed to have correctly discerned and conveyed
the Convention’s prior intended meaning, notwithstanding
any apparent or arguable substantive departure.
The Powell version of the Style doctrine assumes that the
Committee of Style draft—which in most cases is the same
as the final Constitution—must be read to conform to prior
drafts. The Nixon version reverses this direction: the prior
“unadorned language” must be read to have intended what
was expressed in the Committee of Style’s “adorned”
language. 42 “This presumption is buttressed by the fact that
the Constitutional Convention voted on, and accepted, the
Committee of Style’s linguistic version,” the Court
reasoned. 43 To presume otherwise “would constrain us to say
37. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29, 237–38.
38. Id. at 231.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 231–32.
41. Id. at 231 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538–39 (1969)).
42. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231.
43. Id. (citing 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 663–67 (recording the
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that the second to last draft would govern in every instance
where the Committee of Style added an arguably substantive
word.” 44 This would conflict not only with the Convention’s
approval of the Committee of Style language, but also “with
the well-established rule that the plain language of the
enacted text is the best indicator of intent.” 45
While the Nixon Court’s underlying unwillingness to
privilege the “second to last draft” over the Constitution’s
final language is eminently sound, the Court regrettably
failed to rid us of the faulty notion that the Framers’
intentions were all completely captured by the preCommittee of Style draft language recorded in Farrand’s
Records. Instead, the Court perpetuates the mistaken idea
(the errors of which I will discuss in Part II) that the
Committee of Style draft must always be harmonized in
some fashion with prior draft language. Yet the Nixon
Court’s rationale should have dispensed with the Style
doctrine entirely. By arguing that the final language
approved by the Convention “is the best indicator of intent,”
it should not matter whether the Committee of Style made
substantive departures from earlier language. Even if those
changes were based on agreements made off the Convention
floor that were never memorialized in prior floor votes or
were new ideas proposed by the Committee of Style, the
approval of the Committee of Style draft by the full
Convention on September 15 offers a higher-priority signal
of their intentions than previous draft language.
Moreover, the Nixon Court’s claim to be following Powell
makes the Style doctrine hopelessly ambiguous and
indeterminate. The two cases created three related versions
of the Style doctrine. Powell treated the former text as
authoritative, either by reading the Committee of Style
version as automatically synonymous with earlier draft
unanimous consent to the Committee of Style’s version on September 17, 1787)).
44. Id. at 231–32.
45. Id. at 232.
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language, or by requiring that a substantive Committee of
Style change be disregarded. Nixon treated the final
language as authoritative by conclusively presuming that
the former (“unadorned”) language must be read as
synonymous with the final language. Nixon could have
cleared this up by straightforwardly rejecting Powell’s
suggestion that pre-Committee of Style language could ever
supersede apparently inconsistent language in the final
Constitution. But by leaving Powell standing on this point,
the Court still seems committed to the proposition that the
Committee of Style lacked authority to make substantive
changes, and that this lack of authority has interpretive
consequences. In the end, the Court in both Powell and Nixon
refused to entertain the idea that the Committee of Style
might have proposed substantive changes that were adopted
by the full Convention.
The Court reverted to the Powell approach in Utah v.
Evans (2002). 46 There, Utah challenged Census Bureau
practice of using certain inferential statistical practices to fill
information gaps in collecting census data that would
ultimately be used to determine the number of House seats
apportioned to a state. 47 Utah argued that the so called
“imputation”
practice
violated
the
constitutional
requirement that the census be based on an “actual
Enumeration.” 48 According to Utah, this phrase “require[d]
the Census Bureau to seek out each individual,” and
precluded supplementing census-taking with any inferential
or imputational methods. 49 The Court concluded that the
plain meaning of the words “actual Enumeration” does not
compel such a restriction, but went on unnecessarily to find
confirmation in the fact that the phrase “actual

46. 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
47. See id. at 459.
48. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
49. Id. at 473.

2022]

STYLE DOCTRINE

797

Enumeration” was added by the Committee of Style. 50 Citing
Powell and Nixon, the Court determined that the Committee
of Style’s change had to be “the substantive equivalent” of
the Convention’s earlier draft language, which had provided
only that the “number [of inhabitants] shall . . . be taken in
such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” 51 The Evans
majority thus returned to Powell’s supposition that the final
Constitution’s text cannot mean something different than
pre-Committee of Style draft language. In dissent, Justice
Thomas argued that the Court must follow Nixon by
asserting that “[w]hatever may be said of the earlier version,
. . . ‘we must presume that the Committee’s reorganization
or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant
in their unadorned language.’” 52 None of the justices
deviated from the proposition that the Committee of Style
was jurisdictionally limited to stylistic matters.
2. Constitutional Scholars
Given that the Style doctrine has been rendered
ambiguous by the Supreme Court, it might be written off as
a confusing but harmless ceremony that must be occasionally
observed when interpreting disputed constitutional text. But
constitutional scholars have made more of the Style doctrine
than the Court has, expanding at least the possibility of
interpretive mischief. As summarized by Dean Treanor, “a
veritable who’s who of leading constitutional scholars” have
at one time or another based a constitutional argument on
prioritizing draft language over the Constitution’s final
language. 53
The Style doctrine appears to have originated with the
bald assertion by eminent constitutional historian Charles
50. Evans, 536 U.S. at 475.
51. Id. at 474–75 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 183 (Madison)).
52. Id. at 495 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993)).
53. Treanor, supra note 5, at 107.
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Warren in a footnote in The Making of the Constitution
(1928). Warren asserted, in a sentence quoted and relied on
by the Powell Court, “that the Committee of Style had no
authority from the Convention to make alterations of
substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention,
nor did it purport to do so.” 54 Warren cited no evidence for
this assertion anywhere in his book; presumably, he was
relying entirely on a negative inference that a committee
charged with “style and arrangement” was implicitly
debarred from engaging with substance. Notably, Warren
contradicted the second part of his claim—“nor did it purport
to do so”—elsewhere in the book. 55
Numerous constitutional scholars in recent years have
doubled down on Warren’s assertion. 56 For example,
Professors Sunstein and Lessig have argued that because the
Committee of Style was “without the authority to make
substantive changes,” no significance should be given to the
Committee’s addition of the words “herein granted” to the
Legislative Vesting Clause. 57 Professor Sunstein, as well as

54. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 422 n.1 (1928).
55. See, e.g., id. at 638 (“[T]he Committee of Style . . . ignored this vote and
restored Randolph’s original proposal . . . .”); id. at 686–87 (“[I]n a very few
instances changes had been made in the votes of the Convention [by the
Committee of Style] . . . .”); see also id. at 650 (noting that the Committee of Style
declined to make a substantive change to the President’s oath of office, implying
that it could have tried to do so).
56. As persuasively argued by Treanor, “Cass Sunstein, Jack Rakove, Akhil
and Vikram Amar, Martin Redish and Curtis Woods, David Currie, Saikrishna
Prakash, Martin Flaherty, Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan, Richard Fallon,
and Larry Lessig have all misunderstood the Constitution’s text because they
posit[ed] that changes made by the Committee of Style were either ultra vires or
purely stylistic.” Treanor, supra note 5, at 107.
57. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (1994). I agree with their conclusion
that “herein granted” is not substantively significant, but for textual reasons
rather than because of the Style doctrine. See David S. Schwartz, A Question
Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism, and the Limits of
Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 592 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, A
Question Perpetually Arising] (arguing that “herein granted” is merely a circular
reference).
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Professor Rakove, have both argued that impeachable
offenses should be limited to “offenses against the United
States,” because the phrase “against the United States” was
dropped by the Committee of Style whose revision could not
change a prior vote approving that language. 58 Professors
Amar and Amar have argued that the Presidential
Succession Clause prohibits placing the House speaker or
other members of Congress in the presidential line of
succession, relying on the Style doctrine to give priority to
pre-Committee of Style language. 59 And some scholars have
argued that the Judicial Vesting Clause must be read to
implement the so-called “Madisonian Compromise”—giving
Congress the discretion, not the obligation, to create lower
federal courts—despite arguably mandatory language in the
final Constitution, in significant part because of “the limited
charge of the Committee of Style ‘to revise the style of and
arrange the articles agreed to by the House.’” 60
C. The Style Doctrine’s Internal Confusion
Aside from the historical confusion at its core, the Style
doctrine is internally confused in two key respects. First, it
confuses “making” versus “proposing” substantive changes.
Second, it conflates two related but different arguments
about the subjective intentions of the drafters and the
procedural regularity or lack thereof at the Convention.

58. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 48 (2017); Jack
N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 682, 687 (1999).
59. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 115–16, 118–19 (1995); see
also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
60. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
741, 794 n.169 (1984) (quoting 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547
(Madison)); see Treanor, supra note 5, at 92.
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1. “Making” Versus “Proposing” Changes
The Style doctrine is surprisingly confused about the
important—and obvious—distinction between a committee
making and merely proposing substantive revisions. Warren
stated that “the Committee of Style had no authority . . . to
make alterations of substance in the Constitution.” 61 This
may be literally true, for no committee at the Convention had
authority to “make” binding substantive decisions of any
kind. As discussed further below, all committee reports at
the Convention were mere proposals. If the Committee of
Style draft contained any substantive changes to prior
agreed language, these would have been proposals, and such
changes were only “made” by the full Convention voting to
approve them. But the Style doctrine gains most of whatever
force it has by drifting from “make” to “propose.” Warren’s
seminal claim about the Committee’s lack of authority
almost certainly drifted in this manner, and the same is true
about the Supreme Court and the academics who have
deployed the Style doctrine. The real claim underlying the
Style doctrine can only be that the Committee of Style’s
proposed substantive changes have to be rejected because the
Committee lacked authority to propose any substantive
revisions.
2. Subjective Intentions Versus Procedural Regularity
The Style doctrine is at bottom an intentionalist
approach to constitutional interpretation. “[V]irtually all
major interpretive approaches agree that the communicative
intent of the Framers is relevant to the interpretation of an
ambiguous constitutional provision and that the drafting (or
‘legislative’) history sheds important light on that intent.” 62

61. WARREN, supra note 54, at 422 n.1 (emphasis added).
62. David S. Schwartz, Recovering the Lost General Welfare Clause, 63 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 857, 871 (2022) [hereinafter Schwartz, Lost General Welfare
Clause]; see, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1683, 1683 (2012) (noting that historical intent arguments are persuasive
authority in U.S. constitutional culture). Original public meaning originalists
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Where the meaning of a constitutional provision is in
dispute, interpreters routinely ask what the Framers meant
by that language. The Style doctrine purports to ask that
routine question, but does so in an odd and confused way.
The Style doctrine has a highly formalistic aspect. To the
extent that it purports to focus on the formal “authority” of
the Committee of Style, the Style doctrine implies that
procedural irregularities at the Convention could invalidate
final constitutional language submitted by the Convention
for ratification. Here, the supposed procedural irregularity is
a committee exceeding its jurisdiction. Such an implication
might have a superficial appeal to lawyers, who assume the
virtues of procedural regularity as a matter of course. But a
moment’s reflection shows the absurdity of an argument
invalidating final constitutional language based on a
purported procedural irregularity during the Convention.
There was historically no procedural law governing the
manner in which the Convention was to create a draft to
submit for ultimate ratification, and therefore no
authoritative standard against which to judge the internal
procedural “validity” of the Convention’s final work product.
To be sure, the Convention adopted a set of familiar
contend that the “public meaning” of the Constitution’s final language at the time
of ratification is determinative; yet even they, too, find drafters’ intent, and
therefore drafting history, to be relevant to interpretation. See Barnett &
Bernick, supra note 22, at 47 (“[W]e consult [the drafting history and intentions
of the Framers] because they might have special insight into the machine that
they designed.” (quoting Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent,
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 408 (1996)); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning
of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly”
Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1897, 1900–22 (2008) (analyzing
drafting history of Tenth Amendment as part of an inquiry into its original public
meaning); Kesavan & Paulsen, Secret Drafting History, supra note 21, at 1204;
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 279–87 (2001) (analyzing drafting history of Article II
to establish original public meaning of executive powers). Other versions of
originalism embrace the Framers’ intentions as directly controlling. See, e.g.,
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 751, 758–60 (2009) (arguing that drafters’ intent was the dominant
interpretive principle in founding era).
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legislative rules to govern its internal process. 63 But this was
to keep internal order and stay on task. The Convention’s
procedural rules were manifestly not intended to create a
basis for later external challenges to invalidate portions of
its own work. After all, the Convention proceedings were
held in secret, in part because the Framers feared that public
disclosure of its drafting process might “furnish handles to
the adversaries of the Result of the [Convention].” 64 Had the
Convention on the first day voted to delegate the task of
drafting a proposed constitution to the sole discretion of
Gouverneur Morris, the document reported out by the
Convention would have had the same legal status as the one
actually reported on September 17: “nothing more than the
draught of a plan,” as James Madison put it. 65
Indeed, the Convention as a whole was procedurally
irregular. The delegates met in Philadelphia pursuant to
authorizing resolutions from their respective state
legislatures. These resolutions all substantially authorized
their delegates only to amend the Articles of Confederation,
to make them “adequate to the [e]xigencies of the Union.” 66
63. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 8–9 (Journal).
64. Id. at 10 (Madison) (statement of George Mason); see id. at 10 n.4
(Madison) (justifying secrecy of proceedings as well as individual votes “for
reasons similar”).
65. James Madison, Speech on Jay’s Treaty (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16 THE PAPERS
JAMES MADISON 290, 295–96 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) (“But, after all,
whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our
constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide
in the expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from them, it was
nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and
validity were breathed into it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several state conventions.”).

OF

66. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 560 (Virginia delegates’
authorization). This phrasing was repeated in substance in all twelve authorizing
resolutions from several state legislatures (Rhode Island, excepted). See id. at
563–86. That these resolutions reflected the state legislatures’ expectation that
the Convention would merely propose amendments to the Articles, rather than
replace them. See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 52 (2015); MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR
OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE

2022]

STYLE DOCTRINE

803

But from the first week of the Convention, the delegates
consciously chose to exceed their legal authorization: they
determined to jettison the Articles rather than amend them,
and to create a Constitution from scratch. 67 In this sense, the
Convention as a whole was ultra vires. This was reflected in
the premise that the Constitution was to be “ratified.”
Ratification covers all sins by an agent, except fraud.
There is thus no force to any claim that departures from
internal procedural regularity at the Convention might
formally undermine particular constitutional provisions. The
only plausible relevance of the ultra vires argument against
the Committee of Style is the extent to which it reveals the
drafters’ intentions. But it is equally implausible to argue
that the Framers’ actual subjective intentions are to be
conclusively presumed from some purported procedural rule
about committee jurisdiction. One could argue for some
concept of “constructive” intent, as might be used as a rule in
interpreting legal instruments or statutes. But such a
concept makes sense only where drafters’ intent is deemed
legally dispositive, and therefore something that must be
found one way or the other. It makes no sense where, as here,
drafters’ intent is merely relevant evidence of meaning if
evidence of that subjective mental state is available. No
argument for “constructive Framers’ intent” has yet been
offered, and it is difficult to imagine a persuasive one.
In contrast to the implausible, formal “ultra vires”
argument, it might be argued that the Committee’s
assignment “to revise the style of and arrange the articles
agreed to” is merely some evidence of the subjective
intentions and expectations of the Convention delegates in
appointing the Committee of Style. 68 Importantly, this is an
empirical argument about actual states of mind, rather than
AMERICAN STATE 16–17 (2003); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE
MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 140–44 (2016).
67. See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 8, at 29; KLARMAN, supra note 66, at 140–44;
BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 294–95.
68. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547 (Journal).
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a formalistic argument that intentions will be conclusively
presumed from a legal rule or procedure. This “softer”
version of the ultra vires argument is at once more plausible
and much weaker than the conclusive presumption made by
the Style doctrine. It is easily rebutted by historical evidence
of contrary intentions or changed minds. Even if the
delegates initially intended or expected that the Committee
of Style should refrain from suggesting substantive changes,
there is no strong reason to presume that that intention
would have remained unchanged when the delegates were
subsequently presented with a draft that did propose
substantive revisions. There is no evidence to suggest such
an unchanged intention, to offset the inference that the
Committee of Style’s changes were okay—an inference
derived from the Convention’s overwhelming approval of the
Committee of Style report.
The argument that follows in Part II addresses both the
formalistic and evidence-of-intentions versions of the Style
doctrine.
D. The Potential Mischief of the Style Doctrine
Does the Style doctrine create a potential for interpretive
mischief? Or is it a harmless bit of silliness?
The more modest answer is that it obscures our
constitutional history. There is little doubt, as Dean Treanor
has persuasively shown, that the Committee of Style
revisions leaned in a nationalist direction. Whether or not
these were substantive changes, they strengthened
Federalist interpretations. By minimizing or dismissing
these revisions, the Style doctrine furthers the historical
myopia that obscures the Federalist Constitution more
generally and feeds the myth that the Constitution’s original
meaning conforms to the preferred interpretations of the
Jeffersonian-Madisonian Republican party.
This is particularly true in the case of the Preamble. The
Committee of Detail draft opened with a preamble that
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began, “We the people of the States,” followed by a list of the
thirteen states. The Committee of Style famously changed
this to “We, the People of the United States” followed by a
broad list of national purposes of the government, which
were entirely absent from the Committee of Detail draft. 69
Today we say the Preamble is a mere stylistic flourish, but
that is based on trying to harmonize it with
enumerationism—the doctrine of limited enumerated
powers—and is not based on a serious analysis of the
Framers’ intentions or understandings. 70 But recent
scholarship has uncovered a richer history to the Preamble,
one suggesting that the full scope of its meaning was
contested, and that Federalists saw it as something far
broader than a non-substantive throat-clearing introduction
to the Constitution. 71 During the ratification campaign, AntiFederalists anxiously read the preamble as a broad grant of
powers. 72 Federalists played this down during ratification,
but after ratification argued that the Preamble was indeed a
69. Compare id. at 177 (Madison) (Committee of Detail preamble), with id. at
590 (Committee of Style preamble).
70. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (“[The
Preamble] has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Reconsidering the Constitution’s Preamble:
The Words That Made Us U.S., 37 CONST. COMMENT. 55 (2022); Treanor, supra
note 5, at 48–59; Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given:
Enumeration and National Power at the Founding, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 183, 194–
209 (2020).
72. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, (Dec. 3, 1787),
in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 349
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter DHRC] (“I confess, as I enter the
Building I stumble at the Threshold. I meet with a National Government, instead
of a fœderal Union of Sovereign States . . . [,] the Powers of which shall extend to
every Subject of Legislation . . . .”); Brutus XII, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in
16 DHRC (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986), supra, at 74 (“[T]he spirit of the
constitution . . . if it is to be collected from the preamble, in which its end is
declared, is to constitute a government which is to extend to every case for which
any government is instituted, whether external or internal.”); John Smilie,
Statement at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DHRC
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976), supra, at 407–08 (“[The Preamble’s] words have
a plain and positive meaning . . . . Here, sir, we find the right of making laws for
every purpose is invested in the future governors of America . . . .”).
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source of federal governmental power. Federalists in
Congress argued that legislative authority to charter the
First Bank of the United States, as well as other laws, could
be found in the Preamble. 73 This interpretation was buried
under the weight of political success of the JeffersonianMadisonian Republican party in the early 1800s and was
largely forgotten for almost two centuries.
The potential for more immediately practical
interpretive mischief is harder to pin down. In the only
extensive and systematic review of changes made by the
Committee of Style, Dean Treanor documents some fifteen
arguably substantive changes by the Committee to language
adopted by prior votes of the Convention. 74 In theory, that
creates a sizeable number of potential arguments to depart
from the Constitution’s final, ratified language in favor of
some earlier draft version that can be found by combing
through Farrand’s Records. In fact, as I have argued
elsewhere, most of the fifteen changes are stylistic or
clarifying, rather than substantive departures. 75 But a few
could be troublesome.
For example, the Committee of Style changed “officer of
the United States” to “officer” in the Clause defining those
whom Congress may place in the line of presidential
succession. 76 An argument can be made that the latter
expression, but not the former, includes members of
Congress, who might be said to hold offices, but not offices
“of the United States,” if the latter is construed to mean only
executive branch officers. A Style doctrine argument to
revert to the earlier language could lead to a conclusion that
the Speaker of the House cannot be in the line of presidential
succession, leading to the potential unconstitutionality of the

73. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 59; Gienapp, supra note 71, at 194–209.
74. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 113, 116.
75. See Schwartz, Framing the Framer, supra note 7.
76. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 81.
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current presidential succession statute. 77
Also, in Article II, the Committee of Style deleted
“against the United States” from “other high crimes and
misdemeanors” 78 in the Presidential Impeachment Clause,
arguably broadening the impeachment catchall language to
extend to state law crimes. 79 As noted above, some
constitutional scholars have deployed the Style doctrine to
this change to argue for a limitation on the grounds for
impeachment. 80
A further Committee of Style change involved a revision
of the New States Clause that arguably places a flat
prohibition on subdividing a state into two or more states. 81
77. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2020); Amar & Amar, supra note 59, at 115–19. Further
ambiguity is created by the Twentieth Amendment, which arguably supersedes
this aspect of the Presidential Succession Clause.
78. Compare 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 551–52 (Madison)
(“against the United States” inserted), with id. at 600 (“against the United
States” absent from Committee of Style draft).
79. Treanor, supra note 5, at 83–85.
80. See supra text accompanying note 58.
81. On August 30, the Convention had adopted this language:
New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but no
new State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
of the present States without the consent of the Legislature of such State as
well as of the general Legislature.
....
Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or
parts thereof without the consent of the Legislatures of such States as well
as of the Legislature of the United States.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 458 (Journal) (emphasis added). And the
Committee of Style changed it to this:
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new
state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state;
nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of
states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as
well as of the Congress.
Id. at 602 (Madison’s copy of the Report of Committee of Style). The change is the
switch from a comma to a semicolon after the otherwise-synonymous italicized
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The alternative reading would permit such partitions with
the consent of the involved state’s legislature and Congress.
While the flat-prohibition interpretation in my view requires
improperly attributing meaning to a semicolon, the
argument is available. 82
There may be other such perplexities. Enterprising
attorneys might find it advantageous to comb through
Farrand’s Records hoping to unearth differences between the
Committee of Style draft and earlier approved motions and
committee reports during the Convention. They might then
gin these up into arguable substantive differences—thereby
triggering the Style doctrine. The scope of this problem is
difficult to assess. As Treanor observes, despite his effort to
be comprehensive in finding fifteen differences, there are
likely others. 83
II. DID THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY?
No constitutional scholar that I am aware of has
seriously investigated the question of the Committee of
Style’s “authority.” Starting with Charles Warren’s bald
assertion that “the Committee of Style had no authority . . .
to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted
by the Convention,” 84 that conclusion has simply been
assumed. No scholar has pointed to any evidence supporting
the Committee of Style’s lack of substantive authority apart
from the negative inference from its nominal assignment.
The conventional view based on Warren’s conclusion is at
odds with the evidence we have. It reflects a general
confusion about how committees functioned in the
Convention and how we should think about committee
phrases in the two versions.
82. For an elaboration of the argument against attributing Framers’
intentions to mid-sentence punctuation, see generally Schwartz & Enger, supra
note 15.
83. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 6.
84. WARREN, supra note 54, at 422 n.1.
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function in interpreting the Constitution.
A. The Committee of Style’s “Authority”
Aside from meeting as a “Committee of the Whole
House” from May 30 to June 19, 85 the Convention formed
eleven committees during its deliberations. 86 All of these
committees were ad hoc and were formed to deal with
particular issues of widely varying specificity. 87 But nothing
in the rules specified the limits of the substantive authority
of committees. Only one delegate on one occasion during the
entire Convention is recorded as having objected that a
committee “exceeded their powers.” 88 No one echoed this
claim, or made such a claim as to other committee reports,
strongly suggesting that “committee powers” were not a
thing. The referral or commitment of specific issues to
85. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 29, 312 (Journal); Vile, supra
note 12, at 153.
86. Professor Vile counts twelve committees plus the Committee of the Whole
in his comprehensive and useful study of Convention committees. However, this
count includes a supposed five-member committee to consider bankruptcy and
“full faith” provisions. Vile, supra note 12, at 169; see also BILDER, supra note 66,
at 143 (also identifying separate “bankruptcy and full faith” committee). But as I
read the records, that five-member committee was actually the Committee of
Detail, though not named as such by the Journal: its five members were the
Committee of Detail Members Rutledge (the chair), Randolph, Wilson, and
Gorham, with William Johnson of Connecticut substituting for his fellow
Connecticut delegate Oliver Ellsworth, who had by then left the Convention.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 445 (Journal) (identifying the members);
id. at 483 (Journal) (showing that Rutledge presented the report, indicating that
he was the chairman); 3 id. at 587 (Attendance of Delegates) (noting absence of
Oliver Ellsworth from Convention as of August 27).
87. On the more specific end of the spectrum, one committee was assigned to
deal with the apportionment of House seats to each state. See 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 540 (Madison). On the more general end of the
spectrum, a committee was formed to deal with an unspecified set of “parts of the
Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been
acted on.” 2 id. at 473 (Journal).
88. This was James Wilson on July 5, objecting to the first committee effort
to hammer out what would eventually become the “Great Compromise” between
the large and small states. See 1 id. at 535 (Yates); Vile, supra note 12, at 156–
60 (explaining committee’s work).
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committees probably functioned more as a focal point for
committee members to stay on task than a hard-edged
jurisdictional limit.
More importantly, no Committee—not even the famous
Committee of Detail—had “authority” to “make alterations of
substance in the constitution as voted by the Convention.”
Committees issued “reports” to the Convention. Committee
reports were understood as mere recommendations, just like
motions to add or amend language. A proposed constitutional
provision in a committee report had no impact on the draft
unless and until it was adopted by a vote on the Convention
floor. 89 Given this status of Convention committee reports,
the assertion by Warren and others that the Committee of
Style lacked authority to “make” changes to the draft
Constitution is meaningless. The Style doctrine must instead
be based on the claim—implied perhaps by Warren but never
stated in such terms—that the Committee of Style lacked
authority even to propose substantive changes.
The question then becomes whether there is any
evidence to suggest that, unlike all the committees appointed
by the Convention prior to September 8, the Committee of
Style was uniquely and strictly forbidden to suggest any
substantive changes. This seems implausible on its face, and
requires an immoderate negative inference from the wording
of the Committee’s nominal charge to “revise the style of and
arrange the articles agreed to” by the Convention.
Moreover, formal norms regarding Convention
committee procedures and jurisdiction, if indeed there were
such norms, seem to have eroded by August, as evinced by

89. It is not clear whether committee reports required a motion in order to be
put to a vote. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 9 (Journal) (“[T]he
question shall be put upon” a writing—such as a committee report without
mentioning any requirement of a motion.); 2 id. at 495 (Journal) (putting, without
motion, “the question to agree to the first clause of the report”); id. at 499
(Madison) (Convention voted on portions of Committee of Postponed Parts report
without motion). But see 1 id. at 353 (Journal) (“It was moved and seconded to
agree to the second resolution reported from the Committee . . . .”).
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the Convention’s reception of the work of the Committee of
Detail. Comparing the Committee of Style to the Committee
of Detail is instructive on the Convention’s attitude toward
committee “jurisdiction.”
1. The Committee of Detail Compared
On July 23, Elbridge Gerry moved to form a committee
“to prepare & report a constitution conformable” to “the
proceedings of the Convention.” 90 This was the Committee of
Detail, and the “proceedings” to that point were the several
dozen resolutions regarding the scope, structure, and powers
of the proposed national government that had been adopted
by the Convention since May 29. Many of these were
modified versions of resolutions in the VirginiaPennsylvania Plan, plus a handful of provisions from the
New Jersey Plan. 91 Convention President George
Washington’s diary entry for July 27, the first day that the
Convention adjourned to await the Committee of Detail’s
work, suggested that that this Committee was as constrained
as the Committee of Style is conventionally said to be:
In Convention, which adjourned this day, to meet again on
Monday the 6th. of August that a [committee] which had been
appointed (consisting of 5 Members) might have time to arrange,
and draw into method & form the several matters which had been
agreed to by the Convention, as a Constitution for the United

90. 2 id. at 95 (Madison) (emphasis added).
91. The so-called “Virginia Plan” was a collection of resolutions outlining
broad-brush provisions for the new constitution that served as the de facto
template for discussion from May 29 until July 26, when the Convention
adjourned to await the Committee of Detail’s draft. The moniker “Virginia Plan”
understates the probably crucial role of the Pennsylvania delegation in
formulating the plan. In a pre-publication draft of his article, Dean Treanor
suggested that these proposals be “more accurately labelled the VirginiaPennsylvania Plan” in light of the Pennsylvania delegation’s probable substantial
contribution. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener:
Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution 9 (Dec. 1,
2020) (unpublished SSRN draft manuscript) (on file with author) (For the
published version, see Treanor, supra note 5.). I follow this excellent suggestion,
though Treanor omitted it from his final published version. See Treanor, supra
note 5.
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States. 92

This committee charge would appear to be limited to form
rather than substance: note in particular Washington’s use
of “arrange,” which would again be used to define the
Committee of Style’s assignment. 93 Likewise, delegate Hugh
Williamson had anticipated the formation of the Committee
of Detail, noting that “the principles and outlines” agreed
upon by the Convention up to late July would “be referred to
a small committee to be properly dressed.” 94 “To arrange,” “to
draw into form,” and “to dress” do not sound like an
assignment to generate new substantive proposals. That the
Committee of Detail was initially created to address form
more than substance is further supported by the fact that
only five members were appointed to it. The Convention
referred most important substantive disputes to “grand”
committees consisting of one member from each state in
attendance. 95 The only smaller committee prior to the
appointment of the Committee of Detail was the threemember rules committee at the start of the Convention. 96
92. Diary Entry of George Washington (July 27, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Iredell (July 22, 1787), in 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added).
95. See Vile, supra note 12, at 174.
96. Only five committees were not represented by all states present. The
Rules Committee (three members: George Wythe, Alexander Hamilton, and
Charles Pinckney) was plainly procedural in nature. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 2 (Journal). A five member “special Committee” was appointed to
consider the number of House seats to be apportioned to each state—plainly a
substantive matter. Id. at 538 (Journal); id. at 542 (Madison). The Committee of
Detail had five members, 2 id. at 97 (Journal), as did the Committee of Style, id.
at 547 (Journal). See generally Vile, supra note 12 (addressing the role of
committees throughout the Convention). As noted above, a supposed five-member
committee to consider bankruptcy and “full faith” provisions was actually the
Committee of Detail rather than a new committee. See id. at 169. Finally, the
five-member committee on sumptuary laws, appointed on September 13, was
probably nothing more than an unavailing effort to appease George Mason, who
was obsessed with sumptuary laws. That committee never reported. See id. at
173.
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Yet there is little question that the Committee of Detail
offered changes and additions to the resolutions approved up
to that point. 97 It reported out numerous provisions that had
not been formalized in approved motions, or even in some
cases—if Madison’s notes are to be credited—discussed.
These included several of the prohibitions on states, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the Treason Clause, a handful of
enumerated legislative powers, and most of the enumerated
executive powers. 98 The Committee of Detail also flouted its
instruction from the Convention to include property
qualifications for members of Congress. 99
The most salient example of the Committee of Detail’s
substantive revisions concerns the enumeration of legislative
powers. The authorizing resolution adopted on July 17
provided that
the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also
in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or
in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by

97. For example, it changed the wording of the Supremacy Clause from what
had been approved by floor vote. Compare 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at
22 (Journal) (Federal laws “shall be the supreme law of the respective states as
far as those acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and
Inhabitants . . . .”), with id. at 183 (Madison) (Federal laws “shall be the supreme
law of the several states, and of their citizens and inhabitants.”).
98. The Committee of Detail’s limitations on state money powers—to issue
bills of credit or paper money—had not been discussed at all. The prohibition on
states coining money contradicted an express acknowledgement of that power in
the Articles of Confederation. The Full Faith and Credit Clause was carried over
from the Articles of Confederation, but the definition of treason was new. Of the
executive powers, appointments and the veto had been approved as motions, and
the war powers were arguably implicit. The rest of the enumerated executive
powers were in effect proposed by the Committee of Detail. See id. at 185–86
(Madison).
99. Compare id. at 121, 124–25 (Madison) (convention vote approving
property qualifications for members of the national legislature), with id. at 178–
79 (Madison) (Committee of Detail report omitting any such property
qualifications).
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the Exercise of individual Legislation. 100

This was Resolution 6 of the Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan as
modified by Delaware delegate Gunning Bedford’s
resolution. 101 It remains a subject of controversy whether
amended Resolution 6 was intended to be a general
authorization to legislate on all national problems, and
whether the enumeration produced by the Committee of
Detail was meant to be exhaustive—that is, a limiting
enumeration. 102 If the answer to both questions is “yes,” then
the Committee of Detail made a major substantive change.
Either way, the Committee of Detail enumerated specific
powers that had not been formally adopted in motions. The
Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan had not mentioned any taxing
power and no motion formalizing a taxing power was
made. 103 There had been much discussion and several
motions on apportioning the basis of direct taxation, though

100. Id. at 131–32 (Committee of Detail papers).
101. Id. at 21 (Journal); id. at 26 (Madison). For this reason, the entire
resolution is often referred to, somewhat inaccurately, as the Bedford Resolution.
See 1 id. at 21 (Madison) (original version of Resolution 6).
102. The conventional view maintains that the Committee of Detail’s
enumeration was designed to supersede and indeed overrule the broad
authorization of Resolution 6. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 178 (1996); Kurt T. Lash,
“Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action
Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 2126 (2012);
Michael W. McConnell, The Federalist Soc’y, Panel IV: Resolved: The Federalists
Designed a Constitution of Plenary Federal Power, YOUTUBE, at 44:22 (Mar. 4,
2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXKYLnYNxs0 (debate with John
Mikhail) (“Instead of Resolution 6, let’s enumerate powers.”). For recent
scholarship contesting that the enumeration made this change, see generally, for
example, Schwartz, Lost General Welfare Clause, supra note 62. See also Richard
Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003, 2003–06, 2009–
11, 2018 (2021); John Mikhail, Fixing Implied Constitutional Powers in the
Founding Era, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 507, 510–13 (2019) (reviewing JONATHAN
GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE
FOUNDING ERA (2018)); Gienapp, supra note 71, at 183–89; Schwartz, A Question
Perpetually Arising, supra note 57, at 575, 581–82; Calvin H. Johnson, The
Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 27 (2005).
103. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 20–23 (Madison).
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no motions about “duties, imposts, and excises.” 104 These
vital powers, along with the power to regulate interstate
commerce, were apparently simply assumed, and were added
by the Committee of Detail without any apparent discussion
or motion. The power to regulate naturalization was
mentioned in the New Jersey Plan, but never voted on before
the Committee of Detail met; and that of regulating
bankruptcy was apparently introduced by the Committee of
Detail. Even more significant, by assigning Congress the
power to appoint a Treasurer, the Committee of Detail in
effect proposed to make the Treasury an arm of the
legislative branch. The Committee of Detail thereby took
upon itself a major structural point about control over the
management of national finances. 105 None of these latter
issues had been the subject of prior discussions or motions.
The Committee of Detail issued its famous report on
August 6, which was distributed to the delegates that day as
a printed broadside. 106 For the next five weeks, the delegates
presumably used this broadside as their textual reference in
debates and tried to keep up with changes by making
handwritten interlineations on their own copies. 107
Meanwhile, the Committee of Detail continued to meet as
late as August 31, issuing its final report on September 1. 108
By that time, numerous substantive issues had been referred
to it for resolution, and it reported out a handful of
substantive proposals for consideration by the full
104. 2 id. at 181–82 (Madison) (Committee of Detail enumeration of taxing
power); see, e.g., 1 id. at 589–94 (Journal) (taxation debate focusing on direct
taxation rather than imposts, duties, and excises).
105. See 1 id. at 243 (Madison) (New Jersey plan); 2 id. at 181–82 (Madison)
(Committee of Detail enumeration of powers).
106. 2 id. at 176 (Journal); id. at 177 n.3 (Journal) (comparing Madison’s
handwritten transcription of the report in his notes with “the original printed
report”).
107. See, e.g., Committee of Detail, LIBR. OF CONG. (Aug. 6, 1787), https://www.l
oc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/convention-and-ratification.html#obj5
(last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
108. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 483 (Journal).
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Convention weeks after its well-known August 6 draft. 109
None of this is to say that the Committee of Detail
exceeded its authority by proposing its numerous
substantive changes and additions. Rather, it is to say that
the Convention did not adhere to finicky jurisdictional
limitations on a committee purportedly assigned to matters
of “form” and “arrangement.”
2. Late August Committee Referrals
In the last ten days of August, the Convention appointed
three new committees on various issues. In addition, the
Committee of Detail continued to receive referrals and
meet. 110 In more than one instance, more than one committee
appears to have been considering the same, or an
overlapping, issue simultaneously. For example, the
question of whether the national government could assume
state Revolutionary War debts was apparently referred to
both the five-member Committee of Detail and a separate
eleven-member committee, both of which reported proposals
on the issue. 111 The Committee on Postponed Parts, formed
August 31, apparently considered a version of the General
Welfare Clause proposed by the Committee of Detail, even
though the Committee of Detail continued to meet. 112 Thus,
the “subject matter jurisdiction” of the late August
committees, if that term is even applicable, could hardly be
109. Id. at 324–26, 334–37 (Madison) (additional referrals to Committee of
Detail); id. at 366–68 (Journal) (Committee of Detail’s second report); id. at 382–
83 (Journal) (Senate’s treaty power referred to Committee of Detail); id. at 394
(Madison) (also Senate’s treaty power referred to Committee of Detail); id. at 445
(Journal) (Full Faith and Credit and Bankruptcy Clauses referred to Committee
of Detail); id. at 483 (Journal) (final Committee of Detail report).
110. For Committee of Detail referrals, see supra note 109. For other matters
referred to committees, see BILDER, supra note 66, at 143. These additional
committee referrals included slavery, tax duties, and the unspecified grab-bag of
postponed matters.
111. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 327 (Madison) (debt/taxing
power issue referred both to Committee of Detail and new all-states committee);
id. at 352, 366–67 (Journal) (dueling committee reports on issue).
112. See id. at 367, 473, 483 (Journal).
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called strict.
3. Implications for the Committee of Style
The foregoing set of facts strongly suggests that by late
August, the Convention was more interested in wrapping
matters up than in being sticklers about committee
jurisdiction. The Committee of Style members might well
have felt that they were not barred from considering
substantive points, and that the Committee of Detail was a
precedent for them to make substantive changes. 113
Despite its assignment “to arrange” the approved
resolutions and “draw [them] into method and form,” the
Committee of Detail made numerous and important
substantive departures from and additions to the
Convention’s agreements. Yet no scholar that I am aware of
has argued that the Committee of Detail acted ultra vires,
let alone that its draft should carry no interpretive weight.
On the contrary, the conventional view is to assume that any
apparent change proffered by the Committee of Detail was
either ratified by the Convention or consistent with prior
views. Thus, for example, in Powell, the Supreme Court
treated the Committee of Detail’s flouting of the
Convention’s resolution regarding property qualifications as
113. One caveat should be noted. In forming all committees with substantive
responsibilities prior to September 8, the Convention delegates had taken pains
to ensure geographic representation; the eleven-member committees, of course,
included a delegate from each state, while the five-man Committee of Detail had
members from upper and lower New England, the middle states, and the upper
and lower south. The states represented on the Committee of Detail were
Massachusetts (Gorham), Connecticut (Ellsworth and later Johnson),
Pennsylvania (Wilson), Virginia (Randolph), and South Carolina (Rutledge). See
id. at 445 (Journal), 664. But with the Committee of Style, the Convention did
not bother with this: King, Johnson, Hamilton and Morris represented
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania, respectively. Id. at
547 (Madison). Madison was the only southern delegate. This could be construed
as hinting at an intention that the Committee of Style refrain from substantive
revisions. On the other hand, the Connecticut delegation had by September
committed itself to furthering compromise by backing South Carolina’s positions
on key slavery-related provisions, so additional representation of the deep south
may have been deemed inessential.
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a “proposal” rather than some sort of ultra vires act. 114
Similarly, this is how historians conventionally treat the
Committee of Detail’s conversion of amended Resolution 6
(a/k/a “the Bedford Resolution”) into a detailed, purportedly
limiting, enumeration of congressional powers. 115 To be sure,
the Committee of Detail would doubtless have had more
substantive elbow-room than the Committee of Style. But
this difference in latitude is more a function of the state of
proceedings at the relevant times than a distinction between
form/arrangement/style on the one hand and substance on
the other. The Convention had not drilled down to details on
many points as of July 26; by September 8, it had. And many
more disputed points had been resolved by September 8.
Therefore, it would be natural to expect that any substantive
revisions proposed by the Committee of Style would not open
new subjects of debate or re-open debates on closed subjects.
Both committees, as we have seen, were charged with
“arrangement” of approved resolutions and motions. The
difference between “detail” and “style” may be less a matter
of substance-versus-style than of the level of detail involved.
The Committee of Style had details to deal with, but they
were more fine-grained than those confronting the
Committee of Detail. But there is no persuasive reason to
believe that the Committee of Style was therefore stripped of
authority to make substantive proposals per se. Like the
Committee of Detail’s substantive proposals, those made by
the Committee of Style would be subject to approval by the
full Convention. 116
114. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 533 (1969) (treating this
substantive change by Committee of Detail as mere proposal); supra note 99 and
accompanying text (Committee of Detail flouting this instruction).
115. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 273–76; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 238 (1985);
RAKOVE, supra note 102, at 178.
116. Too much should not be made of the different names of the committees.
The committees are today known by names given by legal historians, generally
shortening the designations appearing in the Convention records. See Bilder,
supra note 1, at 1648.
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This point can be generalized to the Convention’s
approach to committees as such. Prior to the Committee of
Style, every Convention committee made proposals to be
submitted for approval by the Convention—as the Powell
Court recognized as to the Committee of Detail. Viewed this
way, the question becomes whether there was something
different about the Committee of Style that would have
precluded it from making proposals subject to Convention
approval. There is no evidence of such a unique restriction.
B. The Committee of Style’s Task
The argument that the Committee of Style lacked
“substantive” authority is made in support of an interpretive
move: the Committee of Style’s language can be overridden
by prior, and presumably more authoritative text. This latter
interpretive move begs three questions. First, is there a
shared understanding of the style/substance distinction at
all? Second, what is this more authoritative text that takes
priority? Third, do the pre-Committee of Style Convention
records provide a complete and reliable record of what was
agreed to? The answers to these three questions cast serious
doubt on the factual underpinning of the Style doctrine.
1. The Exaggerated Style-Substance Distinction
The lack-of-authority argument presumes a sharp
distinction between style and substance, and equates style
with “merely cosmetic” changes. Under this view, the task
“to revise the style of and arrange the articles” meant making
the draft Constitution look pretty. The structural
presentation would be better organized for logic and flow.
Stylistic changes would consist of finding synonymous words
and phrases of greater elegance or aesthetic appeal. As the
Nixon Court put it, the Committee of Style’s job was strictly
to “accurately capture[] what the Framers meant in their
unadorned language.” 117 Had the Committee stuck to such
117. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993).
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style editing, it would have “simply put the finishing touches
on the Constitution,” limiting itself to the “substantive
equivalent” of prior draft language; whereas, otherwise,
revisions by the Committee of Style would necessarily
“change[] the Constitution’s meaning.” 118
This definition of style editing—style as “adornment”—
is unduly narrow and creates a false dichotomy. The task of
stylistic editing certainly entails cosmetics, elegance, and
tone, but often extends well beyond them. Writers who wish
an editor to limit herself to “polish,” typically emphasize the
limited delegation of authority—or would be well-advised to
do so: advising the editor, “don’t change my meaning.” 119 But
between style editing and substantive creation or wholesale
substantive revision is a sizeable gray area. This gray area
itself encompasses a spectrum of editing from style to
substance. On the style end of the spectrum, we might find
revisions that clarify vague or ambiguous language. In the
middle of the spectrum, we might place changes that
reinforce the meaning of the original language. Further
toward the substance end of the spectrum, we might locate
revisions that strengthen or weaken the original language’s
emphasis, revisions that add express language to bring out
implications, and revisions that delete express language to
leave matters to implication. And at the substance end of the
spectrum, we might find revisions that float ideas that the
editor feels are within the spirit of authorial intentions. All
of the kinds of changes in these gray areas fall within a
reasonable definition of the Committee of Style’s jurisdiction,
even if we were to believe that the Committee was
understood to have a formal and limited jurisdiction at all.
Moreover, the Committee of Style and Arrangement was
118. Treanor, supra note 5, at 112.
119. At least one delegate appeared to think that the Committee’s task was to
give the Constitution “its last polish,” seen in the letter from Jonathan Dayton to
Elias Dayton (Sept. 9, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 80, but
that was a clear understatement given the specified duty “to arrange” the
articles.
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also expected to “arrange” the articles. Present-day
interpreters continue to find substantive meaning in the
arrangement of the articles of the Constitution. 120 The
Framers would have been no less able to foresee that a
prospective rearrangement of the articles would have
substantive implications.
2. The Lack of an Authoritative Text
Compare the situation of an editor directed to revise the
style and arrangement of a single rough, but unified draft
with that of an editor who is handed a sheaf of papers and
asked to collate the emendations, additions, and deletions
recorded by several different people. That latter editor might
reasonably be given more latitude and discretion to
determine what the underlying “text” actually says. Both the
Supreme Court and constitutional scholars uniformly refer
to a single draft that was given to the Committee of Style. 121
But that is not what happened.
Legal scholars and historians talk of “drafts” of the
Constitution, as though there was an ongoing process of
updating and distributing paper copies that would allow the
delegates to see before them, in writing, what they were
considering and what they had agreed to. In fact there were
120. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 5, at 6.
121. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474 (2002) (“the Committee of
Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style”); David S. Yellin, The Elements
of Constitutional Style: A Comprehensive Analysis of Punctuation in the
Constitution, 79 TENN. L. REV. 687, 746 (2012) (Committee of Style “revised . . .
an original draft.”); Kesavan & Paulsen, Secret Drafting History, supra note 21,
at 1204 (“the draft of the Framers submitted to the Committee of Style and
Arrangement”); Treanor, supra note 5, at 114 (“the iteration that was given to
the . . . Committee of Style” (quoting Evans, 536 U.S. at 495 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))); see also BEEMAN, supra note 18, at
345 (The Committee of Style “was working to provide the ‘last polish’ to the
document.” (emphasis added)); Creating a Constitution, LIBR. OF CONG., http://ww
w.loc.gov/collections/continental-congress-and-constitutional-convention-from1774-to-1789/articles-and-essays/to-form-a-more-perfect-union/creating-a-consti
tution/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022) (“After five weeks of debate over the committee
of detail’s draft Constitution, the Constitutional Convention appointed a
committee of style to prepare a final version . . . .”).
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only two writings distributed to the delegates over the nearly
four months of the Philadelphia Convention: the Committee
of Detail draft, and the Committee of Style draft. 122 Printed
as broadsides by the Philadelphia printer Dunlap &
Claypool, 123 these were handed out to the delegates on
August 6 and September 13, respectively. 124 There were no
other working drafts generally available to the delegates.
Proposed constitutional provisions and amendments all took
the form of motions or committee reports. Motions could be
written or oral, and committee reports were typically
written. 125 These writings were probably presented in
handwritten form to the Convention secretary, Major
William Jackson, and read aloud by him. According to the
rules adopted on May 28,
[a] motion made and seconded, shall be repeated and, if written, as
it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the
Secretary, before it shall be debated. . . .
....
A Writing, which contains any matter brought on to be
considered, shall be read once throughout, for information, then by
paragraphs, to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any,
made on the second reading . . . . 126

Most of the delegates did not even have access to copies of
the Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan. 127 If the delegates were to
have looked at words on a page before the Committee of
Detail draft was distributed to them, they would have had to

122. See Rapport, supra note 3, at 70–74.
123. Id. A broadside is an oversized sheet printed on one side only.
124. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 176 (Journal); id. at 582 (Journal)
(on September 12, “[o]rdered that the Members be furnished with printed copies”
of the Committee of Style draft); id. at 609 (McHenry) (noting on September 13,
“Recd. Read and compared the new printed report with the first printed amended
report.”).
125. See, e.g., id. at 493 (Journal) (Committee report “delivered in at the
Secretary’s table . . . .”).
126. 1 id. at 8–9 (Journal).
127. See 3 id. at 593.
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rely entirely on their own note-taking. 128 Farrand’s Records
provides all the surviving notes in addition to Madison’s, by
delegates Rufus King, James McHenry, and a few others.
They are extremely fragmentary and, if typical, they indicate
that few if any delegates other than Madison worked off of
verbatim versions of proposed constitutional language before
August 6. 129
After August 6, many or most of the important
agreements were reached in committees, off the Convention
floor and unrecorded in Madison’s notes. The committee
reports typically consisted of draft language, and many such
reports were adopted by floor votes. Like motions, these
committee reports were handwritten documents handed in
to the Convention secretary, who would read them aloud;
sometimes the Committee chair would read the report aloud
before handing it in to the secretary. 130 There was evidently
a bit of scurrying around by a small number of delegates to
make copies of the Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan or to look at
this or that motion or speech by a colleague. 131 On occasion,
the delegates voted to postpone consideration of a lengthy or
complex committee report to give those who wanted to do so
an opportunity to make a personal copy. 132 But these
128. See BILDER, supra note 66, at 3, 23–25.
129. Compare, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 20–23 (Madison’s
notes of Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan), with id. at 27–28 (William Paterson’s notes
of same).
130. See, e.g., id. at 524 (Journal) (report “delivered in at the Secretary’s table
was read once throughout, and then by paragraphs”); 2 id. at 505 (Journal)
(Committee chairman Brearley “read the report in his place—and the same being
delivered in at the Secretary’s table, was again read . . . .”).
131. A handful of delegates transcribed personal copies of the plan. See 3 id. at
593; see, e.g., 1 id. at 24 (reference in Robert Yates’s notes to obtained copy); id.
at 27 (same in James McHenry’s notes).
132. See 2 id. at 368 (Journal) (postponing consideration of Committee of Detail
report of August 22 “in order that the Members may furnish themselves with
copies”); id. at 496 (Journal) (postponing consideration of committee report on the
presidency to allow “members [to] take copies”). On June 15, the Convention
adjourned to enable all delegates to “tak[e] copies” of the New Jersey plan. See
1 id. at 242 (Madison).
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practices hardly sufficed to produce a clear and
comprehensive paper record for the delegates to look at.
After August 6, many delegates must have followed the
emerging constitutional text by making increasing numbers
of interlineations and scratch-outs in their personal copies of
the Committee of Detail broadside. After September 12, they
did the same, interlineating the Committee of Style
broadside. We know this because several interlineated copies
of each still exist, from a handful of delegates. 133
There is no surviving record of what exactly was given to
the Committee of Style. So what exactly did the Committee
of Style revise? Max Farrand, the early twentieth-century
editor and compiler of the Convention records, presents what
he calls “Proceedings of Convention Referred to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement” as though it were a
single organized document incorporating changes to the
Committee of Detail draft. 134 This “document” extends over
the next fifteen pages, under the running header “Committee
of Style,” implying that this was a document given to the
Committee of Style to revise. But in a tiny and easilyoverlooked footnote, Farrand admits that his “Proceedings”
are in fact “compiled by the editor from the proceedings of
the Convention.” 135 That is to say, Farrand himself created a
revised Committee of Detail document incorporating
changes and additions approved by the various motions after
August 6.
What Farrand fails to explain in presenting his
“Proceedings” is that the Committee of Style would have
been handed a stack of documents, not a single document.
The Committee members would have had their personal
interlineated Committee of Detail drafts plus several dozen
133. See, e.g., Creating the United States, LIBR. OF CONG. https://www.loc.gov/ex
hibits/creating-the-united-states/convention-and-ratification.html (last visited
Apr. 28, 2022) (Charles Pinckney’s interlineated copies of Committee of Detail
and Committee of Style broadsheets).
134. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 565–580.
135. Id. 565 n.1.
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handwritten motions and committee reports, and perhaps
also the Convention journals handwritten by Major William
Jackson, the Convention secretary. 136 It appears that
Jackson attempted to keep track of the various changes
made to the Committee of Detail draft in one place, by
interlineating his own copy of the Committee of Detail
broadside. This copy was apparently given to the Committee
of Style, because it ultimately came into the possession of the
Library of Congress among the papers of Committee of Style
chairman William Johnson. 137 A draft marked up by the
Convention secretary and given to the Committee of Style
chairman could well be deemed the “official” single working
draft. 138 But it was imperfect and incomplete, despite
Jackson’s apparent efforts to be neat and thorough. For
example, Jackson failed to include the most recent version of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, a clause whose exact text would
become a source of significant controversy (as will be
discussed further below). Depending on how one counts,
there are at least twelve other significant provisions that
Jackson failed to record and that Farrand filled in. 139
Significantly, Farrand did not simply reproduce the Jackson136. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 1621, 1625–26.
137. See William Jackson Copy of Committee of Style Report, in William
Samuel Johnson Papers, 1745–1936, LIBR. OF CONG. [hereinafter Jackson Copy],
https://lccn.loc.gov/mm79027961.
138. At least one scholar has made this claim. J.H. POWELL, BOOKS OF A NEW
NATION: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, 1774–1814, at 64 (1957).
139. Compare Jackson Copy, supra note 137, with 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 565–80 (Proceedings of Convention Referred to the Committee of Style
and Arrangement). Other omissions by Jackson, filled in by Farrand, include: the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Letters of Marque Clause in the enumeration
of powers, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 569–70; the “port
preference” and tax uniformity provisions tacked onto the end of the Migration
and Importation Clause, see id. at 571; the deletion of Senate powers to make
treaties, and appoint ambassadors and Supreme Court justices, and the insertion
of the Impeachment Trial Clause, see id. at 571; a good deal of the presidential
election provision, see id. at 572–73; the Presidential Qualifications Clause, the
Vice President Clause, and the treaty and appointment powers shifted from the
Senate, see id. at 574; the prohibitions on states’ monetary and war powers, see
id. at 577; and the bulk of the Amendments Clause, see id. at 578.
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Johnson copy in presenting his readers with the
“proceedings” of the Convention given to the Committee of
Style. He would necessarily have referred to other documents
to make up these deficiencies. The Committee of Style would
necessarily have done the same, though without any
guarantee that its concordance would have matched what
Farrand produced.
It would have been challenging to make a verbatim
concordance of these papers in the three and a half days
between the formation of the Committee of Style and its
September 12 report. This task would likely have been
complicated by variations in the delegates’ notes and
recollections of the precise wording (let alone punctuation!)
that had been agreed upon. Subtle changes would be
inevitable even by a scrivener attempting merely to compile
the agreed language.
Farrand also fails to disclose his own editorial
suppositions in compiling his pre-September 8 cumulative
text. Some proposals had not been acted upon: were they all
meant by the Convention to be defunct and off the table, as
Farrand implicitly supposes? Farrand also disregards the
possibility that there were express proposals or
understandings that were unrecorded by Madison—either
because they were discussed (perhaps widely) off the
Convention floor, or because Madison’s care in notetaking
had significantly eroded by this point in the Convention. 140
In short, what historians and Supreme Court justices
call “the text referred to the Committee of Style” 141 is an
editorial convenience created by Farrand. In reality, it was
in no real sense “a text” but an unwieldy sheaf of mostly
handwritten texts, probably filled with scratch-outs,
interlineations, and ink-blots. Undoubtedly, Farrand took
great pains to be accurate, and his editorial compilation
140. For the unreliability of Madison’s notes after August 21, see BILDER, supra
note 66, at 141–53.
141. Treanor, supra note 5, at 72; see sources cited supra note 121.
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appears mostly accurate. But we should remember that the
Committee of Style did not have Farrand’s compilation.
Under those circumstances, the delegates would not likely
have expected the Committee of Style to refrain from
exercising at least some editorial judgment and discretion
with substantive implications.
3. Records Gaps and the Need for Gap-Filling
Third, and related, the ultra vires charge against the
Committee of Style assumes that all “articles agreed to” were
reflected in recorded votes as of September 8. But we know
of at least one instance where that was apparently not the
case: the Committee of Style’s addition of the Contracts
Clause. 142 There may have been others.
As the Convention progressed, it appears that
agreements on some of the thorniest issues were resolved in
committees, particularly in the Convention’s final month. 143
The delegates, after all, lived within a few blocks of the
Convention hall, either in their temporary lodgings or
permanent residences, and frequently dined together. There
was ample opportunity to conduct Convention business
outside the full meetings. 144 While most of these resolutions
142. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 39–41. Rufus King’s proposed “prohibition
on the States to interfere in private contracts” on August 28 was effectively tabled
by a substitute motion regarding ex post facto laws. The delegates assumed they
would have to revisit the issue after at least some of them became convinced that
the prohibition of ex post facto laws would only apply to criminal cases. See
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439–40 (Madison).
143. See BILDER, supra note 66, at 142.
144. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 34–35, 95. Furthermore, historians of
the Convention must proceed with caution in relying on Madison’s Convention
notes, which make up the great bulk of Farrand’s Records. Given both Madison’s
prodigious note-taking efforts and the mesmerizing window his notes provide into
the personalities and debates at the Convention, it is incredibly tempting to treat
the notes as a more or less complete and reliable transcript of proceedings. But
doing so is no longer tenable in the wake of the pathbreaking scholarship of Mary
Sarah Bilder. Her 2015 book, Madison’s Hand, demonstrates that Madison was
never trying to create a complete and unbiased record of proceedings; and of
particular relevance here, she has shown that Madison’s notes of proceedings
from August 22 on are highly unreliable, as they were written at least two years
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would have been reflected in floor votes, not all were. Several
proposals were referred to committees which—according to
both Madison’s notes and the Convention journals—never
reported on them. 145 On August 31, an unspecified grab bag
of unresolved proposals was referred to a new committee
formed to consider “such parts of the Constitution as have
been postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been
acted on,” generally referred to as the Committee on
Postponed Parts. 146 That committee failed to report on all of
those postponed parts. 147 It may have been understood that
one or more of these orphan proposals would be addressed in
the Committee of Style draft. These facts are not consistent
with an expectation that the Committee of Style would
necessarily confine itself to “adornment” of prior language.
C. The Interpretive Irrelevance of Committee Authority
There is a nagging “emperor’s new clothes” quality to the
seriously intoned argument that interpretive consequences
should follow from the Committee of Style’s purported lack
of substantive authority. That is because, on September 15,
the Convention unanimously approved virtually all of the
Committee of Style’s work, making only a small number of
minor changes. 148
In law, the concept of ratification recognizes the validity
and bindingness of an after-the-fact authorization of an
agent’s prior unauthorized acts. 149 That the Framers knew
this concept need hardly be stated: it was the very theory on
which they justified their decision to exceed their own
after the events, in 1789 or later. See BILDER, supra note 66, at 141.
145. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 342–44 (Madison)
(Gouverneur Morris’s proposals for cabinet departments which were referred to
the Committee of Detail).
146. Id. at 473 (Journal).
147. See Schwartz, Lost General Welfare Clause, supra note 62, at 911–14.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 215–217.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 4.01–4.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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limited authorization merely to tinker with the Articles of
Confederation and instead propose a wholly new framework
of government. 150 Under a straightforward application of the
doctrine of ratification, the Convention’s vote to approve the
Committee of Style draft (with only limited emendations)
should make the question of the Committee’s authority
irrelevant and end the matter.
III. DID THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE ABUSE ITS TRUST?
On what basis, then, can the Convention’s ratifying vote
of September 15 be invalidated, even as to individual
provisions? Fraud, perhaps. 151 The idea of “scriveners’ fraud”
on the part of the Committee of Style has been hinted at, but
never developed into a coherent argument for disregarding
the Committee of Style report, either in whole or in part. The
germ of such an argument was first suggested over a century
ago by Max Farrand, who insinuated that Gouverneur
Morris may have been such a culprit. 152 But no scholar has
made a serious effort to develop this insinuation into a fullblown charge until recently. Dean William Treanor, in an
article entitled “The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener,” argues
that delegate Gouverneur Morris was a “dishonest scrivener”
150. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(ratification of agent’s act may be voided by agent’s fraud in procuring
ratification). Conceivably, unnoticed changes “smuggled into” the final draft
Constitution could be questioned as “scrivener’s error.” See ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 20 (1997); Yellin,
supra note 121, at 747–48. Except for punctuation marks, which may have been
left to the discretion of printers and engrossers, it is difficult to imagine proving
scriveners’ errors in the current official version of the Constitution. See Schwartz
& Enger, supra note 15.
152. FARRAND, FRAMING, supra note 18, at 181–82. “[J]ust a little suspicion
attaches to the work of Morris in preparing this last draft of the constitution. It
is partly due to intimations that he himself gave,” citing the 1803 letter discussed
infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text, and “to stories that were whispered
about in the years following the adoption of the new constitution,” citing the
semicolon story, discussed infra Section III.A.2, as “one illustration.” FARRAND,
FRAMING, supra note 18, at 182.
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who misused his role as lead writer for the Committee of
Style to covertly “reverse losses he suffered on the convention
floor” and thus “write into the Constitution his vision of what
the Constitution should entail.” 153 The argument coming
from Treanor is curious, since he ultimately, and
persuasively, concludes that constitutional interpreters
should not disregard the work of the Committee of Style. Yet
the only defensible basis for doing so would be if the
Committee of Style indeed defrauded the Convention, at
least as to some provisions, so as to void, in effect, the
Convention’s ratification of parts of the Committee of Style
draft.
This charge—that either Morris alone or the Committee
members together somehow abused their trust—is not wellfounded. 154
A. Framing Gouverneur Morris
It is tempting to accuse Gouverneur Morris of being a
dishonest scrivener. It offers an entertaining narrative
centered around a lively character. It is harder to prove
wrongdoing by an entire Committee—one that included
James Madison, forsooth!—than by a rogue individual. And
Morris had a somewhat roguish reputation, as Treanor
summarizes in a vivid biographical sketch. 155 Add to that the
fact that all of the (extremely thin) circumstantial evidence
of manipulation by the Committee of Style revolves around
153. Treanor, supra note 5, at 27.
154. In another article, I have gone through each of the fifteen Committee of
Style revisions relied on by Treanor to show that none of them meet all four
elements implied by a charge of “dishonest scrivening”: that the revision in
question “(1) changed the substantive meaning of a prior draft provision,
(2) ‘reversed a loss on the convention floor’ to implement Morris’s preference,
(3) diverged from the majority will of the Convention, and (4) escaped the
Convention’s notice.” Schwartz, Framing the Framer, supra note 7, at 15. Only
four of the fifteen changes can be seen as substantive; of these, the preamble
could not possibly have escaped notice, and the Contracts Clause was debated.
The other two failed the second or third elements. See id.; see also infra note 214.
155. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 11–12.
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Morris, and you have your suspect.
But there has never been enough evidence to proceed
against Morris. Here is the entire case against him. (1) He
was the primary draftsman of the Committee of Style report;
(2) most of the fifteen Committee of Style revisions
(identified by Treanor) advanced views that he held; (3)
Morris supposedly had the character of a rogue; (4) he wrote
a letter in 1803 claiming to have crafted subtle language to
advance one of his policy goals; (5) he wrote a letter in 1814
boasting that he had carefully “select[ed] phrases” to
advance his views on a clause in Article III; and (6) he was
supposedly accused in 1798 of trying to substitute a
semicolon for a comma to convert a harmless clause about
taxing and spending into a broad general welfare legislative
power. Here, I will focus on evidence items 3 through 6. I will
address evidence items 1 and 2—his role as primary drafter
and the conformity between Morris’s views and the
Committee of Style report—in separate Sections below.
It is worth noting that elements 3 through 6 are all
fundamentally “character evidence.” 156 As to his roguish
character in general (element 3), suffice it to say that
historians and biographers—Treanor included—have
stopped well short of suggesting that Morris had a penchant
for fraud. Morris is said to have been a bit of a rake in his
private life, but there is no suggestion that he cheated clients
or engaged in serious unethical behavior involving
dishonesty in his professional or public life. 157 As to elements
4 through 6, one of the letters does not even involve a
Committee of Style revision. While the other two do, the gist
of all three items is to insinuate that Morris had a general
behavioral propensity for sneaky drafting. But Farrand and
Treanor make far more of this than is warranted.

156. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (describing character evidence as both a
generalization about a person’s character and specific acts offered to prove a
character trait).
157. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 11–14.
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1. The “Confessional” Letters
Deeming the two letters as anything approaching
confessions of dishonest scrivening blows them way out of
proportion. Both Farrand and Treanor cite Morris’s 1803
letter to Henry Livingston as an example of Morris’s
penchant for trickery. 158 Discussing the Louisiana Purchase
in this letter, Morris claimed that he worded Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution to go “as far as
circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion” of
newly acquired territories from eligibility for statehood. 159
“Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more
pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been
made.” 160 Here, Morris refers not to anything he drafted for
the Committee of Style during September 8–11, but to a
motion he made on the Convention floor on August 30—
which the Convention approved. 161 It thus offers no instance
of sneaking substantive changes into the Committee of Style
report. Moreover, Morris admits only to crafting strategically
ambiguous language, not to deceiving the Convention. There
is an important difference: the former is not fraud, but is
merely garden-variety legislative drafting behavior to defer
contentious interpretive questions to post-adoption
applications. Moreover, the Clause in question does not in
any obvious way accomplish Morris’s objective—that newly
acquired territories would be “govern[ed] . . . as provinces”
and have “no voice in our councils.” 162 The letter seems to be
more a confession of Morris’s failure to win the point than a
boast of his ability to manipulate the Convention.
Morris’s 1814 letter to Timothy Pickering at least refers
158. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803),
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 404; Treanor, supra note 5, at 14–15.
159. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 404.
160. Id.
161. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 459 (Journal).
162. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803),
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 404.
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to a revision Morris made on the Committee of Style. After
his famous assertion that the Constitution “was written by
the fingers, which write this letter,” 163 Morris went on to say
that, as to “a part of what relates to the judiciary” in the
Constitution, “conflicting opinions had been maintained with
so much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to
select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not
alarm others, nor shock their selflove.” 164 One cannot fairly
stretch this into something approaching an admission of
dishonest scrivening, because it does not reflect an intention
to smuggle language past an unsuspecting Convention. On
the contrary, Morris assumed that his fellow delegates would
read it carefully—hence, he had to “select” his words with
care, at most interjecting an ambiguity that would leave
space for his preferred interpretation. In any case, this was
an isolated incident relating only to a single revision about
the judiciary. 165 What’s more, the provision in question—
most likely the Judicial Vesting Clause—barely, if at all,
made a substantive change. The pre-Committee of Style
version provided that the “judicial power” “shall be vested . . .
in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time
to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United
States.” The Committee of Style changed the italicized
language to “as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” 166 The notion that this represents a change
requires a superfine, if not totally strained, linguistic
163. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 420. Given the fussiness about
punctuation underlying the semicolon controversy, I cannot help but note that
Morris’s use of the comma in this quotation violates today’s grammar rule against
setting off a restrictive clause with a comma. See infra Section III.A.2.
164. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 420.
165. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 16. Although Treanor quotes this admission
four times, he acknowledges that it is less than a full confession. See id. at 7, 16,
115.
166. Compare 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575 (Proceedings of
Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement), with id. at
600 (Report of Committee of Style).
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parsing. 167
2. The General Welfare Clause and the
“Sinister Semicolon”
Treanor relies heavily on the probably apocryphal story
that Morris tried to change the meaning of the General
Welfare Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, by
surreptitiously replacing the comma after “excises” with a
semicolon. 168 That Clause in the final Constitution provides:
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, [comma] to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . . 169

The purported pre-September 8 draft of the enumeration of
powers provided:
The Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, [comma] to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States. 170

The language after “excises” was added to the Committee of
Detail draft by a proposal from the Committee on Postponed
Parts, adopted on September 4. 171 The Committee of Style
report “changed” this to:
The Congress . . . shall have power To lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises; [semicolon] to pay the debts and provide for
the common defence and general welfare of the United States. 172

167. For a more detailed investigation of this trumped-up charge against
Morris, see Schwartz, Framing the Framer, supra note 7.
168. Treanor cites this story early and often. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 5–
6, 18, 22–24, 56, 118 n.663.
169. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
170. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 569 (Proceedings of Convention
Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement).
171. Id. at 493, 495 (Journal).
172. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 594 (Report of Committee of Style);
Treanor, supra note 5, at 20–24. Farrand reproduces Madison’s copy of the
Committee of Style broadside, which contains an erroneous period following
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Eleven years later, in a 1798 House debate over the
proposed Alien and Sedition Acts, Republican Congressman
Albert Gallatin argued that Congress lacked power to pass
those unwise laws, because they fell outside the limited
enumerated powers of Congress. Federalist proponents
argued that they were authorized by Congress’s power to
legislate “for the common defense and general welfare,”
pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 173 To this, Gallatin
rejoined that he was “well informed” that
those words had originally been inserted in the Constitution as a
limitation to the power of laying taxes. After the limitation had been
agreed to, and the Constitution was completed, a member of the
Convention (he was one of the members who represented the State
of Pennsylvania) being one of a committee of revisal and
arrangement, attempted to throw these words into a distinct
paragraph, so as to create not a limitation, but a distinct power. The
trick, however, was discovered by a member from Connecticut, now
deceased, and the words restored as they now stand. 174

Over a century later, Max Farrand recounted this story,
asserting that the Pennsylvania delegate was Morris, the
Connecticut delegate was Roger Sherman, and the “trick”
was the substitution of the semicolon for the comma. Treanor
accepts this tale at face value, and one can understand the
temptation. The story seems to prove “dishonest scrivening”
by itself: an eleventh hour change so subtle that it would
certainly escape notice—a mere dot put on top of a comma!—
“shall have power” that does not appear on the other existing copies of the
broadside. See, e.g., Creating the United States, supra note 133 (Charles
Pinckney’s interlineated copy of Committee of Style broadside); 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 594 (Report of Committee of Style). The Madison copy
also contains various interlineations by Madison, including lettering the
enumerated powers as “((a)), ((b))” etc. which were not in the original broadside.
See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 594 (Report of Committee of Style);
Creating the United States, supra note 133.
173. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1959 (1798) (statement of Harrison Gray
Otis) (“If Congress have not the power of restraining seditious persons, it is
extremely clear they have not the power which the Constitution says they have,
of providing for the common defence and general welfare of the Union.”).
174. Albert Gallatin in the House of Representatives, June 19, 1798, 8 ANNALS

OF CONG. 1976–77 (1798), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379.
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that would convert the Constitution from a moderate
government of limited enumerated powers desired by the
delegates into a consolidated national government with
unlimited powers. What could be more sneaky and
dastardly? The other fourteen changes identified by Treanor
pale in comparison.
This “sinister semicolon” story is most likely a canard,
originating as it does with a politically motivated
congressman who was not present at the Constitutional
Convention, and who claimed to be “well informed” by an
unnamed source. 175 The only other evidence in addition to
this anonymous hearsay informant was the apparent fact of
the punctuation change itself.
Even if Gallatin’s story has any truth, it had to be
misinterpreted by Farrand in order to make it apply to
Morris and the semicolon. We can see that Farrand jumps to
his conclusions, because Gallatin doesn’t actually say that
the change was a punctuation mark. Instead, he cites an
effort “to throw” the General Welfare Clause “into a distinct
paragraph.” That implies a line break, not a change from a
comma to a semicolon, because the Committee of Style draft
put most distinct powers on separate lines, and used
periods—not semicolons—to mark the end of each
paragraph. Here, the story goes astray, because the
Committee of Style broadside did not put the General
Welfare Clause on a separate line or paragraph from the
Taxing Clause. Nor is it clear that Gallatin was even
referring to Morris, whom he doesn’t actually name. There is
reason to believe that Gallatin’s supposed “culprit”—if there
was a culprit—was James Wilson, whom some historians
believe was kibbitzing the Committee of Style. 176
Most importantly, the timing of Gallatin’s story makes
no sense as applied to the Committee of Style’s insertion of
175. Id.
176. See WARREN, supra note 54, at 687–88 (arguing that Wilson is “equally, if
not more, entitled to the honor of making this final draft”).
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the semicolon. Gallatin asserted that “the trick” occurred
only “after” “the Constitution was completed.” 177 But
Farrand and those who repeat his accusation assert that
Morris’s alleged punctuation fraud occurred in the
Committee of Style draft on September 12, three days before
the Constitution was “completed”—approved, that is, by a
final Convention vote. Farrand simply and incorrectly
assumed that the accusation referred to Morris and the
semicolon, and the story has gained legs from uncritical
repetition. 178
Scrutinizing Gallatin’s story carefully with these facts in
mind, the stronger inference is that Morris was wholly
innocent and the punctuation fraud, if any, was the
(re)insertion of the comma. The delegates probably never
approved the comma version as such: the September 4
committee report containing the comma was read aloud to
the delegates, probably without punctuation marks being
read. Instead, the first version the delegates would have read
with punctuation was the Committee of Style broadside with
the semicolon. This version was approved by the Convention
on September 15. Whoever changed the semicolon to a
comma did so without the knowledge of the delegates. The
delegates first saw the engrossed (handwritten) parchment
Constitution with the supposedly “restored” comma on
September 17, when each signed the document. Would any
delegate have taken the time, with others waiting behind
him, to proofread the punctuation of the entire Constitution?
Clearly not. So it was the semicolon, not the comma, that was
approved by Convention vote.
In any case, the punctuation mark simply cannot bear
the interpretive weight of determining whether Congress has
only limited enumerated powers or instead has a broad
177. Albert Gallatin in the House of Representatives, June 19, 1798, 8 ANNALS

OF CONG. 1976–77 (1798), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379.

178. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 115, at 265; Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 338–
39 & n.151 (2002).

838

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

power to legislate for the general welfare. James Madison
hated the General Welfare Clause, yet even he admitted that
“taken literally,” the comma version of the Clause “convey[s]
the comprehensive power” claimed by Federalists. To
Madison, the punctuation argument did not deserve “the
weight of a feather” in interpreting the General Welfare
Clause. 179 That is because, as Professor William Crosskey
observed, the comma version of the Clause “is still
undeniably open to [the general welfare] interpretation as a
mere matter of English,” so that the reinsertion of the comma
as “the method chosen by the skilled lawyers of the Federal
Convention” to negate that interpretation would have been
“singularly inept and ineffective.” 180 Furthermore, it is
apparent that the Framers did not follow the same syntax
rules regarding commas and semicolons that we do today,
and it is likely that they also delegated at least some
discretion to printers and engrossers to insert or change
punctuation marks. 181 It’s thus not even clear that the
Committee of Style meant to put the semicolon there. 182
179. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 411, 417 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); id. at 411
n.2 (“Memorandum not used in letter to Mr. Stevenson.”).
180. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 394 (1953); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West
Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note 178, at 339 n.151 (questioning
interpretive relevance of semicolon); Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (same).
HISTORY OF THE

181. See Schwartz & Enger, supra note 15.
182. There is a simple and completely innocent explanation for the apparent
punctuation “switch.” The original version of the first enumerated power in the
Committee of Detail report looked like this:
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations . . . .
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 181 (Madison). Recall that the comma
version of this Clause, with “to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare,” was contained in the handwritten Committee of Postponed
Parts report of September. Significantly, Secretary Jackson failed to write in this
alteration on his purportedly “official” copy of the Committee of Detail report. See
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Even if the punctuation mark carries interpretive
significance one way or the other—and I believe it does not—
the semicolon did not reverse a Federalist loss on the
Convention floor, as Treanor’s dishonest scrivener allegation
contends. Most delegates probably agreed with Madison that
the General Welfare Clause was more naturally read as
authorizing a power to legislate for the general welfare. 183
The semicolon was either inconsequential, or at most, very
slightly reinforced that reading, but would not have
eliminated the ambiguity surrounding the Clause’s meaning.
Contrary to Gallatin’s claim, and another indication of its
unreliability, is the fact that the General Welfare Clause was
not “inserted in the Constitution as a limitation to the power
of laying taxes.” 184 That was Connecticut delegate Roger
Sherman’s own highly tendentious interpretation of the
language. Two weeks before the semicolon version was
approved by the Convention, Sherman had proposed
language expressly limiting the taxing power to federal
purposes; his motion was overwhelmingly rejected, ten states
to one. 185 In sum, if anything was snuck in, it was the comma.
And if anyone attempted to reverse a loss on the Convention
floor by changing a punctuation mark, it was Sherman—not
Morris. Roger Sherman is a far more likely “dishonest
scrivener” than Gouverneur Morris, at least in this episode.

supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. The “sinister semicolon” may have
been nothing more than the addition of the new language—“to pay [etc.]”—to the
semicolon that was already there after “excises;” in the Committee of Detail
broadside version.
183. See Schwartz, Lost General Welfare Clause, supra note 62, at 925–27.
184. Albert Gallatin in the House of Representatives, June 19, 1798, 8 ANNALS

OF CONG. 1976–77 (1798), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379.

185. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 414 (Madison).
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B. Was Gouverneur Morris a “Lone Penman”?
Emphasizing Morris as the “dishonest scrivener”
encourages readers to believe that the Committee of Style’s
apparent departures from a purely stylistic role were all the
work of Morris. That assertion is highly conjectural and
dubious: it assumes that because Morris wrote out the
Committee draft, he must have personally conceived all the
changes wrought by the Committee. If that assumption is
wrong—if the Committee of Style draft were truly a
committee product—then all the character evidence against
Morris loses what little force it carries. Unless William
Johnson, Rufus King, Alexander Hamilton, and James
Madison were also either sneaks in cahoots with Morris, or
shirkers who didn’t bother to read what Morris was writing,
they would likely have corrected any—or at least most—
dishonest scrivening before submitting their report to the
Convention.
We can agree that Morris was the Committee scrivener
and even its main stylist. 186 But it does not follow that he

186. The historical consensus that Morris personally wrote out the Committee
of Style Draft is probably correct, although the evidence of this is thinner than
one might think. The Committee’s papers, if any, are lost to history, and there is
no Committee draft constitution in Morris’s handwriting—in contrast to the draft
transmittal letter to Congress, which is in Morris’s handwriting. See Treanor,
supra note 5, at 4, 16, 29. The entirety of the evidence relied on by historians
consists of assertions by two biased witnesses: Morris, in his 1814 letter to
Timothy Pickering boasted that the Constitution “was written by the fingers,
which write this letter,” Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering
(Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 420, and Madison, in
his 1831 letter to Jared Sparks, asserted that “[t]he finish given to the style and
arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. Morris,” Letter
from James Madison to Jared Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 499. Morris had an interest in claiming to have written the draft,
both as a matter of ego and to assert a claim to interpretive authority; note how
he exaggerated by claiming to have written “[t]hat document”—the
Constitution—rather than merely a stylistic arrangement on behalf of a
committee. Madison, having devoted his post-ratification career to distancing
himself from his one-time Federalist allies, had an interest in disclaiming
responsibility for the pro-Federalist wordsmithing by the Committee of Style—of
which Madison was a member.
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generated all or even most of the purported substantive
changes. The available circumstantial evidence is more
consistent with the inference that Morris worked with
significant input and supervision from the other Committee
members.
Assuming that Morris did all the scrivening and styling,
there was still ample opportunity for the other Committee
members to influence his work. According to the diary of its
chair, William Johnson, the Committee of Style met three
times between September 8, when the Committee was
appointed, and the morning of September 12, when it
reported. The Committee first met in the evening on
September 8. 187 While the Committee did not meet on
Sunday September 9, it met again on September 10. On that
day, it appears that Morris may have spent the day writing
while the other Committee members had participated “[i]n
Convention.” 188 The Committee then had ample time to
Were this the only evidence, we might have reason to question Morris’s
authorship. But there is further corroboration in the probable fact that Morris
skipped the Convention floor debate on Monday, September 10, to work on the
Committee of Style draft, while the other committee members attended the
Convention. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
187. See Diary of William Samuel Johnson, 1787 (Sept. 8, 1787), 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 554. The Convention rules specified that “Committees
do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be, sitting.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 17 (Madison). Thus, for example, an all-states committee formed
on August 18 to discuss the issue of federal debt assumption, reported its proposal
on August 21, but several of its members spoke in floor debates on the intervening
convention day, August 20, including Langdon, King, Sherman, Dickinson, and
Mason, while McHenry took notes of the full Convention debate on that day. See
2 id. at 322 (Journal); id. at 344–50 (Madison); id. at 351 (McHenry); id. at 352
(Journal). It appears that Committees generally met before or after plenary
sessions on Convention days, and possibly on Sundays, when the Convention did
not meet. According to a September 6 letter to Jefferson, Madison indicated that
he had been participating in committee meetings continually since August 22
“both before & after the hours of the House.” BILDER, supra note 66, at 142
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787)). The
full House met from Monday through Saturday each week, usually from 10:00 or
11:00 in the morning until 3:00, 4:00, or 5:00 in the afternoon. See 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 2; 2 id. at 328 (Madison); 3 id. at 73, 75; BEEMAN, supra
note 18, at 290.
188. See Diary of William Samuel Johnson, 1787 (Sept. 10, 1787), in
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meet, and did meet, on September 11. 189 That morning, as
soon as the delegates were called to order, the Convention
immediately adjourned for the day, “the Committee of
revision not having reported, and there being no business
before the Convention.” 190
This timeline is fully consistent with the likelihood that
the Committee members gave input to Morris as he began
the writing work. Morris had Sunday and Monday,
September 9 and 10, to work on his own. The Committee
probably reviewed Morris’s work and gave further input
after the Convention adjourned on Monday, September 10,
and again on Tuesday, September 11—why else would they
have met? Moreover, the September 11 morning
adjournment would have given the Committee members all
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 554. The Committee of Style was
appointed near the end of the session on Saturday, September 8. 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547 (Madison). On Monday, September 10 (the
Convention never met on Sundays), Madison’s notes record no participation by
the usually loquacious Morris. Id. at 557–64 (Madison). Counts of recorded
speeches in Madison’s notes show that Morris spoke more frequently than all but
one other delegate, despite the fact that he was absent from the Convention for
all of June. See Delegates’ Speeches, Motions, and Committee Assignments in the
Constitutional Convention, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE AM. CONST., https://csac.
history.wisc.edu/document-collections/the-constitutional-convention/delegatesspeeches-motions-and-committee-assignments-in-the-constitutional-convention/
(last visited Apr. 28, 2022); 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 589
(Attendance of Delegates). Madison’s notes for September 10 do account for
speeches, motions, or seconds by three of the five members of the Committee of
Style: Madison, Hamilton, and King. 2 id. at 558–64 (Madison) (Madison’s
participation); id. at 558–62 (Hamilton’s); id. at 562, 563 (King’s). Johnson, the
Committee Chair, did not speak, but was in attendance. We can infer this because
Connecticut is recorded as casting votes on motions, id. at 557 (Journal), and the
rules required the presence of two delegates for a state to cast a vote. By
September 8, Roger Sherman was the only other Connecticut delegate still
attending the Convention. 3 id. at 587, 588, 590 (Attendance of Delegates) (noting
absence of Oliver Ellsworth from Convention as of August 27). All this raises a
strong (if not quite ironclad) inference that the only member of the Committee of
Style absent from the proceedings on September 10 was Morris, which is
consistent with the notion that he was at home busily writing the Committee of
Style Draft.
189. Diary of William Samuel Johnson, 1787 (Sept. 11, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 554.
190. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 581 (Journal).
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day to work together on the report. The speculation that
Morris worked entirely or mostly on his own is no more
plausible—and
probably
less
plausible—than
the
speculation that Committee members sat in the same room
as Morris throughout the day on September 11 and discussed
or even dictated revisions.
There was no demand that the Convention resume on
September 12 if the Committee of Style was not ready. So,
there is no basis to infer that Morris crammed down a set of
revisions of his own by giving the Committee no time to
review them. The suggestion that Morris went rogue and
prepared the Committee draft without its input, supervision,
or approval is not just purely conjectural and inconsistent
with the fact of the three Committee meetings: it is flatly
implausible. The strong-mindedness of Hamilton and King
and their Federalist ideas need no elaboration here. 191
Madison, by this point in the Convention, had shown an
aptitude for wordsmithing to finesse disagreements. 192 We
can attribute the style and arrangement to Morris’s
“fingers,” and even speculate that he was “first among
equals” on the Committee without conceiving the Committee
of Style draft as Morris’s own work and crediting him with
(or blaming him for) any and all substantive changes. 193
191. For King’s speeches reflecting his nationalist views, see, for example, 1 id.
at 323 (Madison) (“The States were not ‘sovereigns,’” and “[a] Union of the States
is a union of the men composing them, from whence a national character results
to the whole. Cong[res]s can act alone without the States . . . .”); id. at 492
(Madison) (“King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree . . . .”); 2
id. at 220 (Madison) (King had been willing to make concessions to slave states
“to strengthen the Genl. Govt.”).
192. See BILDER, supra note 66, at 141.
193. For many years, many historians and legal scholars have assumed that
Madison played an outsized role in crafting the Constitution. His role has been
grossly exaggerated, and more recent scholarship has emphasized the large
contributions of other delegates, especially Morris, James Wilson, and the
Convention President and leading man of the nation, George Washington.
Emphasizing the individual contributions of these figures is an important
corrective to the Madison myth, but in busting that myth, scholars should avoid
falling into their own “great man theory” of the Framing. There is no doubt that
Morris was a leader of the Federalist faction at the Convention and wielded great
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The likelihood that Committee of Style report was a
committee product, rather than Morris’s individual one,
significantly weakens the “dishonest scrivener” narrative.
That narrative relies heavily on the character evidence
against Morris. It is much more difficult to make the case
that an entire committee was engaged in a covert project to
“smuggle in” Federalist readings of the Constitution, at least
several of which Madison disagreed with. 194
There is no doubt, as Treanor ably shows, that the
overall thrust of the Committee of Style edits was to
emphasize or reinforce Federalist interpretations of various
elements of the Constitution. 195 But as Treanor also ably
shows—though at times loses sight of—these were Federalist
interpretations, and not personal pet projects of Morris. 196 It
is one thing to chart Morris’s influence, but quite another to
infer that the rest of the Committee of Style passively
rubber-stamped his work. For example, the Preamble—
whose nationalist turn worked the most striking substantive
departure from prior language—comports with statements
made, not only by Morris, but also Committee of Style
members Rufus King and Alexander Hamilton to the effect
that the United States was (or should be) a consolidated
nation rather than a league of states. 197 Treanor successfully
influence. But acknowledging that is not the same thing as saying that he acted
on his own.
194. Madison could not have been entirely pleased with the Preamble, which
can be read as supportive of broad national powers. In his post-mortem
Convention letter to Jefferson, Madison insisted that the Convention had opted
for limited enumerated powers. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 133–34. In Federalist
41, Madison for the first time expressed his long-running aversion to the General
Welfare Clause, which echoes the Preamble’s “general welfare” language. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
195. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 46.
196. See id. at 48–104 (sections discussing of fifteen Committee of Style
revisions).
197. See id. at 28–30 (Morris’s nationalism); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
1, at 287 (Madison) (Hamilton’s statement advocating that national government
power “must swallow up the State powers”); supra note 191 (King’s nationalism).
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demonstrates that most of the Committee of Style changes
reflected Federalist ideas. But the available evidence does
not show that Morris was the creator of those ideas or even
the moving force for inserting them into the Committee of
Style draft.
C. Did Committee of Style Changes Diverge from
Convention Majority Views?
This last point leads naturally into the next one: the
Committee of Style revisions were consistent with the views
of a majority of Convention delegates. This should hardly be
a surprise, given that the Convention unanimously approved
the Committee of Style report with only a few changes.
Nevertheless, Treanor suggests that many or most of the
changes made by the Committee diverged from majority
votes on the Convention floor. 198 This in turn creates a
potentially misleading impression—surely not intended by
Treanor—that “the Federalist Constitution” was a distinctly
minority viewpoint at the Convention. The focus on Morris
as “lone penman” furthers this misapprehension, perhaps
even suggesting that the Federalist views were somewhat
idiosyncratic to Morris.
Treanor insightfully discusses the specific issues of
constitutional politics raised by the various Committee of
Style revisions. But a comprehensive assessment of the
political leanings of the Convention delegates on these issues
presents a huge and challenging undertaking. Such an
assessment remains to be done and may never be done
because of limitations of the documentary record. 199
Even Madison suggested that the states could be reduced to the status of
counties. Id. at 449 (Madison).
198. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 46.
199. Three factors complicate the inquiry into any delegate-by-delegate
assessment of Convention politics. First, many delegates spoke infrequently or
not at all, though they may nevertheless have been influential. See generally
Delegates’ Speeches, Motions, and Committee Assignments in the Constitutional
Convention, supra note 188 (counting delegate speeches). For example, George
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Nevertheless, constitutional scholars and historians broadly
agree that the Convention leaned nationalist compared to
the overall political views of the state legislatures and the
nation at large. 200 Those state legislatures had authorized a
Convention to consider amendments to render the Articles of
Confederation “adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.” 201
Despite the views of a vocal minority who preferred merely
tweaking the Articles and who claimed that the Convention
lacked authority to do more, the great majority of delegates
endorsed or agreed with the overhaul-from-scratch
approach. 202 The nationalism of a new government that
could tax and regulate the people directly and function
without dependence on the states cannot be minimized. It
should also be noted that only about one-third of the fifty-five
Convention delegates at one time or another joined the
Washington is recorded as having spoken just once, see id., yet he was probably
hugely influential. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE WORDS THAT MADE US:
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION, 1760–1840, at 212–17 (2021) (making
case for Washington’s influence). Second, votes are recorded by states, not by
individual delegate counts, see, for example, 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1,
passim, reducing individual votes in many cases to inference or guesswork. Third,
Madison’s notes may be incomplete or inaccurate in particular instances. See
BILDER, supra note 66, at 4–5, 226–28.
Constitutional scholars and historians have generally gone as far as broad
collective assessments of Convention politics and appraisals of the views of the
handful of delegates with robust evidentiary records. This would include
delegates whose paper trails are sufficient to support substantial biographies and
those recorded by Madison as having spoken with sufficient frequency and clarity
on salient issues to support solid inferences about their views. This sensible
approach to evidence-based history leads to emphasizing—and at times perhaps
exaggerating the importance of—particular individuals, or to using particular
individuals as proxies for more widely shared beliefs. When employing the latter
approach, as Treanor does, it is important to keep in mind that the individual is
representative of a point of view.
200. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 20–21; KLARMAN, supra note 66, at 8;
MAIER, supra note 8, at 466; MCDONALD, supra note 115, at 186–88, 199–202.
201. See, e.g., 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574 (Delegates’
Credentials–Delaware). This language, quoted from the Delaware General
Assembly resolution appointing delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, was
typical of most of the state resolutions authorizing participation in the
Convention. See id. at 559–86.
202. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 66, at 144.
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Jeffersonian-Madisonian opposition or the Republican Party
before 1800, and only three of the forty-two delegates present
on September 17 refused to sign the Constitution. 203 The
document reported out of the Convention contained
ambiguities and reservations in favor of states’ rights, to be
sure, but it was unmistakably “Federalist” in Treanor’s
sense.
Treanor does not in fact claim that the Convention
leaned Republican, but rather that Morris made most of the
fifteen wording changes “to reverse losses he”—and, by
implication, the Federalists—“suffered on the Convention
floor.” 204 This assertion can be misleading: it could
mistakenly be read to imply that all Convention votes on
individual provisions reflected majority preferences. Yet
many provisions were included or rejected by the Convention
to satisfy minorities, not majorities. The slave importation
provision is a well-known example: only Georgia and South
Carolina demanded a guarantee of protection of slave
importation from abroad. But they persuaded enough other
delegations that this was a deal-breaker that they were
accommodated by a majority that preferred to ban slave
importation. A slave-state minority likewise insisted on the
Fugitive Slave Clause. 205 The eventual removal of the word
“justly” from that Clause—one of the fifteen changes cited by
Treanor—could hardly be characterized as a minority
position simply because a provision with “justly” in it had
previously been approved by a majority vote. 206 Most of the
Committee of Style revisions are better characterized as
clarifying majority views that might have been blurred by an
earlier vote to accommodate a minority. Overall, in my
203. This is my own analysis based on biographical data. See, e.g., Meet the
Framers of the Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/founding-fathers (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
204. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 27.
205. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 443 (Madison).
206. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 43; Schwartz, Framing the Framer, supra
note 7.
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review of the fifteen revisions cited by Treanor, I found none
that could clearly be characterized as reversing a Federalist
loss. 207
D. Did the Convention Fail to Read the Committee of
Style Draft?
Because the Style doctrine is at bottom an argument
about Framers’ subjective intentions, it is not sufficient to
rely on conclusive presumptions either that the Framers
carefully read, or did not carefully read, the Committee of
Style draft. This, too, is an empirical question.
Treanor’s dishonest scrivener narrative claims that the
Committee of Style changes were snuck past an inattentive
Convention, whose delegates missed their significance.
Treanor’s evidence supporting the global claim of
inattentiveness is that the delegates by September 13 were
“weary” and “quickly went through the document in order to
bring the Convention to a close.” 208 Therefore, they would
have missed the “subtle” substantive changes wrought by
Morris. (Presumably, the other Committee of Style members
would have missed the changes for the same reason. For if
they agreed to the changes, then perhaps the revisions were
not contrary to the Convention’s intent after all.) The
assertion of the Convention’s inattentiveness is troubling,
because it suggests grounds for an argument that the
Convention therefore did not truly ratify the Committee of
Style changes. Treanor stops short of making this claim,
which indeed would undermine his conclusion that the final
language of the Constitution should have priority over
previous draft language.
But the claim of the Convention’s inattentiveness rests
on dubious or implausible inferences. For starters, it grossly

207. See generally Treanor, supra note 5; Schwartz, Framing the Framer,
supra note 7.
208. Treanor, supra note 5, at 20.
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exaggerates the difficulty of carefully reading a 4,500-word
typeset document over the course of two and a half days. And
it ignores the powerful incentives the delegates had to read
the Committee of Style draft carefully. Consider that the
delegates well knew that the document would propose a
radically new plan of government. And consider further that
the Committee of Style draft presented the first real
opportunity for the delegates to see their work as a whole. As
Professor Bilder has keenly observed, “the politics and
process of drafting the document deferred comprehension of
the Constitution as a unified text.” 209 As noted above, the
delegates did not have the benefit of Farrand’s single preCommittee of Style “draft”—a compilation created through
the editorial judgment of a historian a century and a quarter
after the fact. Instead, they each presumably had their own
interlineated copy of the printed Committee of Detail
broadside handed out to them on August 6. From then until
September 10—the last day of debate before hearing the
Committee of Style report read aloud—the Convention voted
on over 270 motions, the great majority of which were
proposed additions or amendments to the Committee of
Detail draft. The delegates would have been hard-pressed to
accurately mark up their Committee of Detail broadsides:
they would have had to accurately record which motions
were approved, rejected, and postponed or referred to
committees; the wording of each; and, as some would have it,
even perhaps the punctuation of each. 210 Again, these
motions were read aloud and usually not circulated among
the delegates on paper. Any delegate who missed a day here
or there, or dozed off, or briefly spaced out, would have failed
to register changes to the text on his draft. In addition, five
committees met in this time frame, and each of those
209. See BILDER, supra note 66, at 3.
210. . . . if punctuation was as critical as agitators over the two semicolon
controversies would have it. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text
(semicolons in New States Clause) and supra Section III.A.2 (semicolons in
General Welfare Clause).
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reported a substantive change or addition, also read aloud. 211
Delegates would have had some additional sheafs if they
made personal copies of lengthy and complex committee
reports. And of course, there may have been “postponed
parts” that remained to be acted upon. 212
No human beings, not even the “assembly of demigods”
(in Jefferson’s famous phrase), 213 could keep all this stuff in
their heads. How might the delegates have coped? It is
reasonable to assume that each of the delegates focused on
the issues of greatest import to himself, and figured that the
remaining details would become clear when he received the
next printed broadside cumulating all the changes. That
printed broadside was, of course, the Committee of Style
report. The Committee of Style draft was the first moment in
the Convention since the Committee of Detail draft on
August 6 that pulled everything to that point together. To be
sure, the foregoing suggests that it would have been difficult
for many delegates to compare prior agreed resolutions with
the Committee of Style report. But that would be all the more
reason to read the Committee of Style report with care to
ferret out any objectionable terms. The most reasonable
expectation was not that the delegates would sign it without
reading, but that they would eagerly read the Committee of
Style draft carefully to get their first holistic sense of what
they had created.
Moreover, everyone present knew the wording of the
what the Convention had agreed to by September 8 would be
changed by the Committee of Style—that was its job—and
there is no basis to attribute to the Convention’s collection of
sophisticated lawyers, merchants, and legislators a belief
that a purely “stylistic” editing job would not and could not
change meaning. Even law students are not that naïve. Also,
211. See Vile, supra note 12, at 166–71.
212. See supra text accompanying note 146.
213. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), in 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 76.
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consider the fact that there were forty-one delegates present
other than Morris by this stage. If, as Treanor claims, Morris
was single-handedly undermining the intentions of large
numbers of delegates, it is not plausible that all of those
delegates were asleep at the switch. It would only take one
skeptical delegate to unearth any particular subtle-butimportant change. 214
The attribution of deceitful intent on the part of Morris
(or the Committee of Style collectively) assumes that Morris
(or the Committee) believed that the delegates would be
inattentive readers. To assume that Morris or anyone else on
the Committee of Style believed they could have their way
with a tired and lazy group of delegates who would sign
without reading is purely conjectural, and not plausible. Nor
can we assume, based purely on hindsight, that the
Convention was determined to break up on September 17
and therefore would have a pre-set and short time limit in
which to review the document.
Finally, the Convention records point strongly against
the generalized inference that the delegates were inattentive
to subtleties in the Committee of Style draft. That draft was
214. We can also evaluate the claim of the Convention’s inattention by
individually reviewing the fifteen Committee of Style revisions cited by Treanor.
Doing so bears out the implausibility of the claim of inattentiveness to the
Committee of Style changes. Three revisions—the Preamble, the Fugitive Slave
Clause, and the Contracts Clause—can be discarded right away. It is not
plausible that any delegate missed the change to the Preamble; the other two
were in fact noticed and debated. The changes to the Legislative and Executive
Vesting Clauses are too prominently placed to have gone unnoticed. The two
“sinister semicolons”—in the General Welfare and New States Clauses—were
subtle but the likelihood that they changed, and were intended to change
meaning, is low. Of the remainder, only two changes are arguably both
substantive and subtle: dropping “of the United States” from “officer” in the
Presidential Succession Clause; and dropping “against the United States” from
“high crimes and misdemeanors” in the Impeachment Clause. Perhaps none of
Morris’s forty-one colleagues noticed these deletions, but neither amounts to
dishonest scrivening. As Treanor observes, the former revision did not “clearly
advance[ a goal] that Morris had unsuccessfully fought for.” See Treanor, supra
note 5, at 82. The latter, I have argued, did not go against the will of the
Convention and would probably not have raised an objection if it had been
noticed. See Schwartz, Framing the Framer, supra note 7.
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first read aloud on September 12. The next morning, the
printed copies were distributed, and “[i]t was moved and
seconded” and agreed “to proceed to the comparing of the
report, from the Committee of revision, with the articles
which were agreed to by the House.” 215 The Committee of
Style draft was thereupon, over the next three days, “read by
paragraphs, compared, and in some places corrected and
amended.” 216 By September 14, the delegates had worked
their way through Article I, Section 10. They completed their
review at the end of the day on September 15. Over those last
three days of debate, the delegates made (by my count)
twenty-two changes to the Committee of Style draft. 217 None
of these could be deemed a major change, and as
significantly, none involved a repudiation of a substantive
proposal of the Committee of Style. At the same time, the
changes were numerous and detailed, attentive to subtleties,
and well spread across Articles I through IV. This supports
the inference that enough delegates were reading the
Committee of Style draft with enough care to refute the
implication of overall inattentiveness. To take just one
example: on September 15, the delegates voted to drop the
word “legally” from the draft Fugitive Slave Clause to avoid
the subtle implication that slavery was either moral or

215. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 605 (Journal).
216. Id. (Journal).
217. Nine changes were made on September 13 and 14: changing “servitude”
to “service” in the Three-Fifths Clause, and deleting “to” before “establish justice”
in the preamble, id. at 605 (Journal); adding “except as to the places of choosing
Senators” in Article I, § 4, id. at 613 (Madison); deleting the enumerated
congressional power to appoint a treasurer, adding the uniformity proviso at end
of the taxing power, deleting “punish” before “offenses against the law of nations”
in the Piracy Clause (on Morris’s own motion!), id. at 614–15 (Madison); replacing
“annually” with “from time to time” in the journal publication requirement of
Article I, Section 5, Clause 3, id. at 618–19 (Madison); adding “a regular
statement and account of [etc.]” to the Appropriations Clause in Article I, Section
9, Clause 7, id. at 619 (Madison); and reordering the prohibitions on states in
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. Id. at 618–19 (Madison). The thirteen additional
changes made on September 15 were similar in scope and importance. See id. at
621–22 (Journal).
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conformable to law in the abstract. 218 The unanimous
adoption of the Committee of Style report, as amended, is
thus sufficient to overcome the fraud allegation or any other
imputation that the Constitution as approved on September
15 was not wholly the Convention’s work.
IV. INTERPRETIVE IMPLICATIONS
The Style doctrine should be eliminated from our
panoply of accepted interpretive approaches to the
Constitution. By giving interpretive priority to draft
language, the Style doctrine goes against a basic interpretive
norm that the final language of a legal text is authoritative.
The purported historical grounds for the doctrine are based
on nothing more than the name given to the committee in
question—and a shorthand name at that. The weight of the
evidence shows that the Committee of Style was not
foreclosed—either as a matter of formal procedure or
informal expectations—from proposing substantive revisions
to the collection of approved motions and committee reports
that comprised the “draft” constitution as of September 8,
1787. Nor is there any basis for the more recent charge that
the Committee of Style somehow abused its trust.
On one level, eliminating the Style doctrine is completely
straightforward. It simply removes one line of argument
from constitutional debate. It does not require an embrace of
any of the several versions of originalism, or of a strict
version of textualism. To be clear, dispensing with the Style
doctrine does not mean that prior drafts are irrelevant or
impermissible references in the interpretive enterprise. The
Style doctrine is different from the general principle that
legislative history—including prior drafts—may be relevant
evidence of drafters’ intentions when the final language is
vague or ambiguous. Unlike standard resort to legislative
history, the Style doctrine can be invoked even when the

218. See id. at 628 (Madison).
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Constitution’s final language is clear, and it treats the earlier
draft as authoritative text rather than as evidence of
Framers’ intent.
Eliminating the Style doctrine carries broader, albeit
less immediately practical,
implications for
our
understanding of the Constitution’s history and original
meanings. The Committee of Style shaped the final version
of the Constitution in a decidedly Federalist direction. Yet
many subsequent interpretations of key constitutional
provisions,
particularly
those
emphasizing
“dual
sovereignty” and “limited enumerated powers,” were those
that were favored by Jeffersonian-Madisonian Republicans.
Translated to present-day constitutional politics, these
Republican interpretations are congenial to politically
conservative originalists, and are assumed to reflect the
Constitution’s original meaning. 219 But it was not the
original language of the Constitution that dictated these
interpretations.
Consider the following narrative of the founding. In 1786
and 1787, a critical mass of key leaders concluded that the
government under the Articles of Confederation was failing.
The Confederation governmental system left the United
States vulnerable to external threats and internal disunion
and dissolution. They persuaded the state legislatures to
send delegates to a national Convention for the stated
purpose of proposing amendments to render the Articles of
Confederation “adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” 220
But a large majority of delegates had nationalist leanings
stronger than those of the state legislatures that sent them,
219. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 561 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (adopting Madison’s narrow interpretation of implied powers);
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 90 (2013) (describing narrow construction of commerce power as
“a long-standing originalist interpretation of the Constitution”); Barnett &
Bernick, supra note 22, at 42–43 (stating that New Deal commerce power cases
were not “good faith” interpretation).
220. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574 (Delegates’ Credentials–
Delaware). See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

2022]

STYLE DOCTRINE

855

and the Convention quickly agreed to scrap the Articles and
reframe the government from scratch. Within this majority,
a powerful bloc—including such delegates as George
Washington,
Alexander
Hamilton,
James
Wilson,
Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, and Rufus King—
favored strongly nationalist provisions that would later
become associated with the Federalist Party. Yet they were
constrained by the need for consensus of all the state
delegations at the Convention and the need for their
proposed Constitution to be ratified by state conventions that
leaned less nationalistic than themselves. As a result,
several of their preferred positions were couched in
strategically ambiguous language in the proposed
Constitution reported out of the Philadelphia Convention on
September 17, 1787. As the state ratifying conventions
deliberated, these delegates and their Federalist allies
repeatedly downplayed their preferred interpretations. But
after winning ratification, the Federalists advanced these
interpretations, including, for example, that Congress had
the power to address all national problems, that the
Preamble had operative legal significance, and that that the
government of the United States possessed the inherent
powers of national governments. 221 These interpretations
were contested throughout the 1790s by an emergent
Republican opposition, led by Jefferson and Madison. With
the continued electoral successes of the Republican Party
(and its Jacksonian-Democrat successor) from 1800 onward,
the
Jeffersonian-Madisonian-preferred
interpretations
became entrenched. By the mid-twentieth century it became
virtually impossible for constitutional interpreters—jurists
and historians alike—to view the Jeffersonian-Madisonian
Republican interpretations of the Constitution as anything
221. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 5, passim. For a detailed outline of specific
positions and interpretations that comprise the Federalist Constitution, see
generally David S. Schwartz, Jonathan Gienapp, John Mikhail & Richard
Primus, The Federalist Constitution: Foreword, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669 (2021),
and the various articles in that symposium. Symposium, The Federalist
Constitution, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669 (2021).
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other than its original meaning. The Federalist Constitution
was effectively buried in our collective historical
consciousness. 222
The foregoing narrative of the lost Federalist
Constitution combines both conventional and revisionist
elements. The inadequacy of the Confederation system to the
requirements of a true national government is well known
and understood. So is the fact that the Convention delegates
agreed at the outset to scrap the Articles of Confederation
and start over. Less ingrained in our conventional founding
story, but generally well understood by historians, is that the
Convention delegates collectively leaned more nationalist
than the state legislatures and the public at large. 223 But
beyond these points, the conventional narrative becomes
confused. The conventional narrative fails to explain how
Republican and even Anti-Federalist views became
constitutional orthodoxy, and simply confuses orthodoxy
with “the original understanding.” 224 In contrast, a new wave
of revisionist scholarship has begun seriously re-examining
the conventional history that treats the Republican
Constitution as synonymous with the original meaning of the
Constitution. This scholarship shows, not that the Federalist
Constitution should be taken as authoritative, but rather
that constitutional meaning was contested from the outset;
and therefore, as Dean Treanor has argued, the existence of
Federalist interpretations alongside Republican ones at the
founding “reveals a new reason why the search for collective
constitutional meaning is illusory.” 225 Moreover, in several
222. Schwartz et al., supra note 221, at 1670.
223. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
224. I use the phrase “original understanding” rather than “original meaning,”
because the latter term is associated so strongly with present-day originalism.
But the confusion of orthodoxy with the original understanding of the
Constitution extends beyond originalists to most interpreters. Virtually all
constitutional interpreters consider historical understandings of the
constitutional text and the intentions of its authors to be interpretively
important, if not dispositive.
225. Treanor, supra note 5, at 107.
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instances, “the Federalist reading is not simply a plausible
competing reading but the superior reading of the text,
because the Republican readings cannot fully explain the
Constitution’s text.” 226
Interpreters, past and present, who wish the
Constitution to conform to Jeffersonian-Madisonian
Republican constitutional politics must ignore or explain
away constitutional text rather than hew closely to it. 227
They necessarily insist that the preamble is meaningless
fluff, that the General Welfare Clause means something
other than “what its literal words express” (as Madison put
it), and that the Necessary and Proper Clause ends with “the
foregoing powers,” ignoring the part that says “and all other
powers.” 228 To deny the Federalist interpretations of these
and other provisions, originalist-textualists today must
resort to what Treanor aptly calls “loose construction.” 229 In
this sense, the Style doctrine is part and parcel of a collective
forgetting of the Federalist constitutional vision at the
founding. Dropping the Style doctrine and its mistaken
historical premises will help us better to see and understand
the Constitution’s history.

226. Id. at 104.
227. See generally Treanor, supra note 5.
228. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 179, at 417;
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1058–71
(2014) (tendency to ignore “all other powers” provision).
229. See Treanor, supra note 5, at 116 & n.660.

